Robelo points out that the CIA-directed mining of Nicaragua`s harbors prompted the first congressional reversal of the administration`s contra policy and says: ”So we are the ones who suffered because of the mistakes of the CIA. We were totally cut off, and the yo-yo went down all the way. When we finally were able to turn it around, the yo-yo went only halfway up-humanitarian aid-so you can live and be well fed, (but) they can kill you because you have no weapons. Then we were able to turn it all the way up again, and the $100 million was approved. But then Irangate explodes, and we go all the way down to zero. And now we are going one-fourth up again with humanitarian aid. Is this a policy? Can we, with such an erratic ally, do anything?”
Contra director Sanchez echoes that sentiment, but he notes that it didn`t start with the Reagan administration or with either the Democrats or the Republicans. ”The Nicaragua problem stems from bad U.S. policy over 40 years, by Republicans and Democrats alike,” he says, pointing out that there was strong U.S. support for the hated Somoza dictatorship, then a reversal of that support shortly before he was overthrown. ”U.S. aid to the contras has never been consistent enough to put constant pressure on the Sandinistas to make them democratize or to make the resistance effective enough to prevent them (the Sandinistas) from governing,” he asserts.
”The administration and the Republicans didn`t take stronger action for fear of losing the White House, and so it`s a question of the (1988) race for the White House,” concludes Sanchez. ”The problem is with the American system. It`s American politics. It revolves around getting and keeping the White House.”
Even administration officials acknowledge that from the beginning, its contra policy was plagued with problems. Because its implications and consequences were never carefully thought through, it was never wholly embraced by many of those who had to sell it, these officials say. ”It evolved from a covert program, and it was never sold within the administration the way it could have been,” explains one U.S. diplomat stationed in Central America. ”We should have been less embarrassed about it. We were sort of hat- in-hand and on the defensive about it. We can`t blame it all on a Democratic Congress,” says this diplomat. ”It was the right policy, but it could have been managed better.”
Since the Arias peace plan was approved, there has been a growing sense among moderates in the administration that sooner or later, President Reagan would have to embrace a negotiated solution or be seen as standing in the way of peace. But if Reagan sticks to his guns, as conservatives hope, that could leave Bush and the GOP in an awkward position. ”The conservatives may want to bring the policy to a vote in Congress for more contra aid and, if it fails, to blame the loss of Nicaragua on the Democrats,” says an informed U.S. observer with ties to the Nicaraguan government.
”But Bush may want to campaign on peace and prosperity. If he has this on his back, why not declare victory and get the Sandinistas to sign a nonaggression pact to kick out the Cuban advisers and renounce Soviet aid?
They would do that.”
If the Reagan administration refuses to budge, then Reagan`s successor must decide whether the United States should resume direct bilateral negotiations with the Sandinistas after a hiatus of several years. A study by the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan coalition of former U.S. and Latin diplomats, recommended earlier this year that ”the United States should negotiate directly with the Soviet Union and Nicaragua to reduce Soviet military presence and bar advanced weapons systems from the region.”
Regardless of negotiations, a collapse of the resistance could mean the flooding of Central America with refugees, according to contra military spokesman Bosco Matamoros. In addition to the estimated 500,000 Nicaraguans who have already fled this nation of 3 million since the Sandinistas took power, Matamoros estimates that if the rebel organization disintegrates, another 150,000 to 200,000 people-contras, their families and supporters-will leave.
Calero sees irony in the successes Reagan has had in supporting the Afghan rebels and pressing for the ongoing Soviet pullout from Afghanistan.
”The Reagan Doctrine was not a success (in Nicaragua) on account of the opposition that it had in Congress. But what I find very ironic is that it worked in Afghanistan because there was consistency there. And it`s really a shame that in Afghanistan, a neighbor of the Soviet Union, the Soviets are marching out in defeat, while in Nicaragua, the freedom fighters are marching out, (though) undefeated, because of a lack of a consistent U.S. policy.”
Fifteen years after U.S. troops were pulled out of Vietnam, the United States faces another crossroads. Once again, one path could leave a strong, anticommunist ally making a hopeless last stand all by itself. The other path could prolong war in the region for years to come. To a U.S. diplomat based in Central America, a Vietnam-type quagmire awaits Americans once again if they don`t keep the contras going as an option for the next administration.
”That`s where we`re headed,” he maintains, ”and that`s why we want to keep them viable. We can still walk away if we choose, but this time, the war is here, in our own neighborhood. I have a 15-year-old son. I think the probability is that if we don`t keep this option, his generation will be fighting down here. This is still our neighborhood.”
Sandinista spokesman Espinoza retorts that the United States has a greater responsibility to be a consistent neighbor in Latin America than to try to keep supporting the contra war effort. ”Throughout history, there has been a negative trend by the United States against Latin American countries-violating their rights to sovereignty and self-determination,” he says, alluding to past U.S. interventions in the region and support for
authoritarian regimes in Chile, Haiti and Paraguay. Espinoza says Nicaragua poses no real threat to U.S. national security, despite warnings of expanding Soviet influence.
Whatever the U.S. owes the contras, settling that debt may have to wait until after the nation goes to the polls this November. The Republicans argue strongly against deserting an ally in need, but it`s going to be very hard to make a case against peace negotiations if they are still underway. The Democrats argue the nation can live with the Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua, but it`s going to be increasingly difficult for them to defend that position if the Managua regime returns to its old repressive ways.
How the issue develops in the U.S. presidential campaign will likely decide whether embattled Nicaraguans can expect to see war or peace on their tattered horizons. And surely there will be more pressure on the next Congress to agree on a bipartisan consensus to bring a measure of consistency to a U.S. policy long dangerously adrift. Perhaps no single outside voice has had more influence on this policy than that of Oscar Arias, who recently offered to play an even ”more active” role in the peace process.
Graced by the Nobel Peace Prize, Arias says he finds that his voice has become ”crucial” in the ongoing debate over U.S. support for the contras and the efforts to win peace for the entire region. Raising that steady deliberate voice again to insist that the contras are the problem, not the solution as Reagan still believes, Arias makes a compelling point: ”We are convinced that in today`s world, if there is the capability to reach agreement for the reduction of nuclear weapons, there`s no reason we should not reach agreements about the regional conflicts.”
