It was a dramatic and precedent-setting idea. As conceived by Britain and endorsed by the European Community, the United Nations would carve out a protected ”enclave” in northern Iraq, by force if necessary, where the Kurds could be safe from Saddam Hussein.
There were a lot of reasons behind the idea, but few had much to do with the Kurds. Rather it grew from a compost of Western guilt, European ambition, British politics and Luxembourg`s machismo, plus the concern of two powerful women in London and Paris.
Seen with the hindsight of several days, the plan had too many holes to stay afloat. At any rate, it seems to have been overtaken by President Bush`s warning to Hussein to stop using force near the Kurds and other refugees fleeing the Iraqi army, creating a de facto sancutary around them.
But it remains a case study in the way international diplomacy often works, and how local politics can combine with a real problem to produce a headlong solution that could come back to haunt its creators.
The starting point, as with the Bush proposal, was the growing realization that the Persian Gulf war and its aftermath had created a Kurdish tragedy.
As media reports of the Kurds` plight multiplied, public pressure grew on governments to do something, anything, to help. Two women added their voices to this pressure.
One was Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the French president and a longtime campaigner for the Kurds. She told French television and, presumably, her husband that the Kurds ”are being exterminated … My grief is beyond imagination.”
The other was Margaret Thatcher, increasingly restive in her new role as Britain`s ex-prime minister. Cornered by reporters, she urged her successor, John Major, to get aid to Kurdistan fast, without ”standing on legal niceties.”
Thatcher seldom misses anything, so she probably knew that, as she spoke, Major was at a soccer game. The next day`s papers made him look as unconcerned as America`s fishing president.
Major had another item on his agenda. Thatcher had made Britain the odd-country-out in the European Community. Major has spent the last five months mending fences on the continent. Now he wanted some way to show that Britain not only cooperated with the EC but could lead it.
Into this mix fell European self-esteem. About a year ago, the European Community was rushing toward unity on its way to becoming the new superpower of the 21st Century.
Then came the world`s outrage at Iraq`s occupation of Kuwait. The U.S. emerged as the one and only superpower. Whenever the Europeans tried to influence Iraq, the Iraqis ignored them. When fighting began, some Europeans, like Britain and France, fought. Others, like Germany, paid. A few, like Belgium, did next to nothing. Most Europeans conceded they aren`t ready for unity.
With the war`s end, the EC nations needed some way to restore the push for unity, by finding a big foreign policy that they could all accept. If this meant seizing the diplomatic lead from Washington, so much the better.
Thus, the ingredients of the stew were ready. All that was needed was a stove to cook them on. Enter Luxembourg.
Luxembourg, with less land and fewer people than Rhode Island, is the EC`s Lilliput. But every EC country gets to be president of the community for six months, on a rotating basis. The first half of 1991 is Luxembourg`s turn. Among other things, that means the leaders of the 12 EC countries will hold one of their twice-yearly summits in Luxembourg in June. But a new custom of second, ”emergency” summits has arisen. It began in 1989 when France, then the president, called an emergency summit to discuss the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ireland and Italy followed suit in 1990.
Many people doubt these emergency meetings are really necessary. But Luxembourg was not to be denied. Egged on by the French, it called an
”emergency” summit, ostensibly to discuss EC unity.
It took two weeks even to find a date when all 12 leaders could respond to this ”emergency.” By the time they met last Monday, the Kurdish crisis had replaced unity as the emergency du jour.
It`s doubtful that, without this special meeting, the enclave plan would have come up. But Major, goaded by Thatcher and his own itch to make a splash in Europe, spent the pre-summit weekend working with Foreign Office officials to frame it.
No other European nation was told. Nor was the U.S. Nor, even, were Iraq`s Kurds.
At 5 p.m. Monday, Major opened the Luxembourg summit by proposing an enclave in northern Iraq, which is the Kurds` traditional home, staffed by UN observers and protected by UN forces.
By 8 p.m., the EC accepted the idea. Francois Mitterrand, the French president and, more important, Danielle`s husband, offered to co-sponsor it at the United Nations.
All this was rushed through even though it would have threatened the dismemberment of Iraq. The UN has acted in the past, as it did in Kuwait, to keep a country intact, but never to carve it up.
Major described the enclave as temporary, but admitted that it ”could be a long-term commitment.” Other officials warned the EC idea could lead to a permanent refugee enclave such as the Gaza Strip, with all the unending problems that implies.
Major insisted that Hussein, having tasted Western power, would agree to the enclave. He hinted the UN should use force if necessary, but no one seemed to have a clear idea how the area could be secured, and Iraqi soldiers there controlled, if Iraq objected-as it did one day later.
The British also were unclear whether a Kurdish enclave would set a precedent. If the UN set up an enclave for the Kurds, why not set up others for Palestinians in Israel, or Tibetans in China, or newly independent Georgians in the Soviet Union, or Ossetians in Georgia? There was no answer.
The general European attitude was summed up by Dominique Moisi, a leading French political thinker who saw all the pitfalls of the Major plan but liked it anyway.
”It does create a precedent,” Moisi said. ”We`re entering an unknown situation, to say the least. But when confronted with an exceptional situation, one must find exceptional ways to answer it.”
Also, as Moisi pointed out, most Europeans are offended by the realpolitik of the U.S. position on intervention to protect the Kurds and
”wanted to promote something on our own.”
After the summit, Major told reporters, ”there`s every indication that the United States will support us.” But it didn`t. Although Bush said he had ”no differences” with Major, the emerging U.S. plan focused more on humanitarian aid, a protected but temporary border strip and a warning to Hussein to leave the Kurds and other refugees alone.
The European plan, like other European moves since the gulf crisis began, seemed likely to be trampled by events.
