The honeymoon on NATO expansion was over long before the wedding ever began. By the time President Clinton could formally invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the security organization, French President Jacques Chirac had insisted upon two additional members, had agitated for European command of NATO’s southern fleet and, after losing on both counts, balked at the idea of paying “1 cent” to finance NATO expansion.
Unfortunately, Clinton’s decision to fight the French on these matters was the wrong approach. Rather than use American weight within NATO to ram through his agenda, the president should have stepped aside and let the French have their way. Abdication? Perhaps. But the truth is that before we worry about American boys dying in Warsaw, we ought to reflect on whether American boys still belong in Berlin.
This is not to suggest the U.S. should withdraw from Europe entirely. Consider instead an arrangement like the one Russia will soon enjoy. The U.S. (and presumably Canada) would withdraw from NATO and join an expanded version of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council set up in Brussels in May. Like Russia, we would have a “voice, not a veto” over NATO’s affairs. Also like Russia, we would cooperate with NATO in a variety of capacities–contributing to rapid reaction forces, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, etc. But the ultimate effect would be to cede the disproportionate power and responsibility we’ve long held in Europe back to the Europeans themselves.
Several advantages of this situation suggest themselves right away. To begin with, for the first time in almost 50 years, we would be forcing the Europeans to take responsibility for their own security. While it is true that during much of this period they were simply not in a (financial) position to do so, over the past few decades NATO has become a mechanism by which wealthy European countries free ride on U.S. security provision. Unfortunately, the ensuing perverse incentive effect has been profound. Precisely because they know the U.S. will assume leadership in the event of a serious threat to their security, Europeans have been encouraged to sit idly by and watch as a crisis like Bosnia unfolds.
Second, for all of President Clinton’s talk about redefining NATO for the post-Cold War World, NATO is doomed to remain a Cold War institution as long as the U.S. retains its membership. Recall that during the Cold War NATO was foremost a proxy for American containment policy. Now that the Communism has collapsed, however, there is no external threat to deter. This leaves NATO with only one legitimate function: preserving security among European states.
To do so, NATO must shed its traditional bulwark mold and become a European organization for European security. This would not only give NATO the clearly-defined purpose it so desperately needs, it would also nicely complement the political and economic integration currently underway in Europe.
Further, it’s only within this context that NATO expansion makes sense. As a European organization for European security, it follows that NATO would seek to incorporate all European states while excluding decidedly non-European states like the U.S. and Canada. And because actions speak louder than words, the absence of direct U.S. participation is the only credible way of signaling that the belligerent, Cold War function of NATO is no more. Faced with such evidence of NATO’s new, innocuous mission, Russian hard-liners would find it exceedingly difficult to assert antagonistic motives for NATO expansion.
Of course, there are those who will see an American withdrawal from NATO as a recipe for disaster. They will insist that the Europeans have proven time and again that they are incapable of keeping peace among themselves, and they will attribute the past five decades of stability in Europe to America’s presence there.
But these criticisms ignore several key facts. First, a U.S.-NATO alliance would keep us involved enough in Europe to deter adventuring by any would-be regional hegemon. Second, even as our military involvement declines, our economic ties to Europe by way of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the G-8 and the World Trade Organization would continue to afford us leverage in European affairs. Third, any doomsday predictions based on historical analogies are tenuous at best. It is certainly true that peace in Europe coincided with the American presence there, but this peace may well have derived from the need to balance the Soviet threat, or from the stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence, and not at all from our involvement.
Finally, it’s not as though the American retrenchment in Europe would occur overnight. Just as there is a 10- to 12-year timetable for admitting new NATO members, there should be a similar timetable for America’s exit. Such a transition period would provide ample time to take appropriate stabilizing measures, like ensuring that nuclear deterrence prevails across Europe.
In the end, the issue comes down not to technical or strategic feasibility–the plan is clearly tenable in these respects–but to whether Americans can handle not being the world’s policeman. There’s no doubt that we’ve long identified ourselves with this role; it’s a source of national pride. But in this era of decreasing budgets and increasing domestic problems, it’s just not realistic. How long before we’re mature enough to accept this?
