At the Pentagon, the dog days of summer are threatening to stretch into months of malaise. Stories of sexual misconduct in the military continue to grab headlines. Pressure continues to build on the armed forces to do more with less. And there are lurking signs of sinking morale.
The Air Force seems to have been particularly troubled of late. There was, of course, the Kelly Flinn case. And maybe even more worrisome, there have been the early retirements of two Air Force generals at the zenith of their careers–one who resigned on principle and one who was pushed out because he failed to safeguard his troops from a terrorist bomb in Saudi Arabia that killed 19.
In denying a promotion to Brig. Gen. Terryl J. Schwalier–and thus, effectively, forcing his resignation–Secretary of Defense William Cohen wisely drew a distinction between being “held accountable” for command decisions and being made “a scapegoat” because a situation happened to go bad.
Added Gen. John Shalikashvili, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Commanders are responsible for the decisions they make, and where appropriate they should be held accountable. . . .”
Cohen decided it was appropriate in Schwalier’s case, despite arguments by the Air Force and the Air Force chief of staff at the time, Gen. Ronald Fogleman. In Cohen’s judgment, Schwalier, despite intelligence warnings about a terrorist threat, failed to take precautionary steps to protect the Dhahran housing, including having an effective alarm system and a sound evacuation plan.
For Fogleman, Cohen’s decision to end Schwalier’s career was too harsh. So he resigned–the first senior military adviser to step down voluntarily and the first to quit in protest.
The fact is that senior officers and field commanders must, indeed, be held accountable. By blocking Schwalier’s second star, Cohen sent the right message.
But it must be noted that in the Khobar Towers bombing, the Pentagon’s principal investigator, a retired Army general, concluded Schwalier’s superiors didn’t give him enough support and guidance.
So the question is not whether Schwalier should have been disciplined–he should have been. The question is whether others ought to have been disciplined along with him–others higher up the chain of command. For accountability must go up as well as down, up even to the Oval Office, the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs.
Cohen correctly placed the spotlight on the issue of accountability. Fogleman underscored it with his resignation on principle. Neither action ought to deepen the military’s malaise.
