Even though every airline in the nation has gone on record as saying that Peotone will not fly, there is a way to guarantee its success–close O’Hare International Airport or Midway Airport.
Absurd? One need only look at real-life examples around the world to see that this unlikely scenario is the only way to assure some measure of success for an airport inconveniently located 35 miles from the Loop.
The nation’s newest airport, Denver International, which is only 23 miles from the central business district, required the closure of Stapleton, the original Denver airport. The world’s next new airport will soon open in Hong Kong the day after Kai Tak, the existing airport, is decommissioned. The story is the same in Milan, Berlin and Munich, where new airports serve as replacements, not competitors, to existing facilities.
And what if a city’s existing airport does not close? A look at the recent experience in Montreal provides a telling experience. In 1974, Montreal’s only airport, Dorval, was Canada’s primary international gateway.
In 1975, Montreal opened a new “visionary” airport in Mirabel, 34 miles from downtown. After more than 20 years, the overly optimistic demand projections used to justify Mirabel never materialized. Mirabel is now considered a failure and an embarrassment to the city and the nation. Today, nearly all the traffic has moved back to Dorval, leaving Mirabel dormant and indeed less productive than it could have remained as prime agricultural land.
Unfortunately, the Montreal story does not end with the failure of the new airport. Because Montreal failed to capitalize on its natural geographic advantage and the synergies of a strong connecting hub market, it lost its position as Canada’s primary international gateway to Toronto and its most important economic engine.
Chicago cannot afford to make the same mistake. Chicago, with the nation’s largest mid-continent population base and as home to the world’s only dual airline hub airport, is clearly strong enough to support both a primary international gateway at O’Hare and a close-in direct service reliever airport at Midway. Further, despite the maturity of the domestic market (as evidenced by more than 125 non-stop domestic cities served, many with hourly service), substantial opportunity still exists for continued growth in the international market.
Achieving this potential, however, requires the strength of O’Hare’s connecting airline network and access to Chicago’s population base. Dissecting the region’s market among three airports would destroy O’Hare’s unique advantage and would jeopardize Midway’s role as a convenient direct-service reliever. A rural third airport, therefore, would only be sustainable as a complete replacement for O’Hare or Midway.
The stakes are indeed higher for the world’s busiest airport. Policymakers should heed history and its failed examples and look around the world before weakening Chicago’s dominant position as the nation’s air transportation crossroads.
