“Breaking out of the Iraq morass” (Editorial, March 22) urges the Clinton administration to switch to “a firm policy of deterrence, backed by the threat of massive retaliation.”
That last phrase is code language for the use of nuclear weapons. A legitimate case can be made for retaining a minimal number of warheads as a means of deterring another nuclear power, but their use against a non-nuclear state–even one using chemical or biological weapons–would be condemned by much of the world. The consequences of nuclear explosions, both short-term and long-term, are so horrendous as to outweigh any possible military advantage.
Nor are nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence. Saddam Hussein may be crafty and cruel, but he’s not crazy. Reportedly stunned by the ferocity of the 1991 attack on his country, he is quite aware of America’s conventional capability and unlikely to attack our Middle East allies any time soon.
Finally, the possession of nuclear weapons, and veiled threats of their use, send the wrong signal to the world; the leaders of other nations, noting how we justify these devices as vital to national security and as proper tools of statecraft, may be tempted to follow suit, effectively undermining our stated goal of non-proliferation.
