Ambassador Nancy E. Soderberg, alternate U.S. representative for special political affairs, represents America in the United Nations Security Council. Her primary responsibility is UN peacekeeping at a time when the troops are underfunded, overworked and under fire around the globe. An expert on conflict resolution and arms control, Soderberg is helping the UN rethink strategy for its post-Cold War peacekeeping.
Q: Tell us about the changes in the UN since the end of the Cold War and how this new era has changed the role and the mission of the UN.
A: The issue of peacekeeping has evolved in a variety of fundamental ways since the end of the Cold War, and one could argue that the UN is now more relevant and more engaged than ever before in its 50-year history. If you look at the role of the United Nations during the Cold War, it was primarily a body to underscore differences more than to get things done. We had roughly 700 resolutions passed in 40 years, 13 peacekeeping missions and almost 300 vetoes during that period. That was a period of great division and not consensus on how to approach world conflicts, and the UN was often marginalized from the key conflicts.
The 12 years since the end of the Cold War are very different and the UN is at the center of almost every conflict and playing an extraordinarily positive role. Look at the sheer numbers. You have close to 700 resolutions that have been passed just in the 12 years, very few vetoes–around nine–and over 40 peacekeeping operations.
Q: What mistakes have been made along the way?
A: The evolution of peacekeeping has been fairly dramatic over the last 10 years. For the UN and the international community and the U.S., there was a collective failure of judgment in the early part of the ’90s, when you had the peacekeeping disasters in Somalia and Bosnia, and we have learned from that. We have begun to ask tough questions and demand results before the UN even goes in there, to the point now where there is a general acceptance that the UN cannot conduct a war–it cannot force a peace agreement to work.
But where there is a peace agreement that is functioning, the UN can assist in the process of helping create a civil society in which to have a stable government. To assist in elections and try to integrate combatants into society and help stabilize the situation. What it cannot do is help implement a peace agreement that is not being respected by its partners or implement peace agreements that have unrealistic goals. If you look at what is happening in Congo and Sierra Leone, those are two peace agreements that are problematic for a variety of different reasons.
Q: What are the problems with them?
A: In Congo, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement [named for the capital of Zambia, where it was negotiated] is a very good agreement. It provides a blueprint for reconciliation and the building of a peaceful, stable, democratic, inclusive government in Congo. Unfortunately, the signatories are not yet fulfilling their agreement. You’ve got Rwanda and Uganda fighting a war because in Uganda you have the rebel groups still fighting the government forces. And obviously that’s not moving forward and at this stage the conditions are not right for the United Nations to go in.
The basis on which the UN peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone shifted in recent months when the rebel group reneged on its commitment and decided to attack the UN peacekeeping force. It was one of the more devastating situations for the UN.
Q: What lessons did we learn from these two places?
A: That first and foremost it’s up to the parties to live up to their commitments; the UN cannot force them to live up to their commitments. Second, the UN must be involved in developing these peace agreements early on. It cannot be asked to go in to implement a peace agreement in which it had no role.
Q: How do we fix the UN’s finances?
A: I think there’s general agreement that we first of all have to fix the financing of the peacekeeping and get a revised scale of the assessments so that the United Nations charges a fairer rate for peacekeeping operations in general. We need to make sure we pay our dues in full. And we need to make sure that peacekeeping operations can be deployed more efficiently, more quickly and with troops that are well-equipped, well-trained and well-managed from the headquarters. It needs a much stronger planning cell in the UN headquarters and much faster procurement and hiring procedures. You cannot buy a paper clip with the same procedures that you deploy troops.
Q: How much damage have we done to ourselves by not paying up on our regular dues and our peacekeeping dues?
A: Our peacekeeping dues are over $1 billion and the failure to pay those dues has been damaging not only to the U.S. but also to the troop-contributing countries. What it means in practical terms is that the troops who are on the ground are not getting paid. That’s an obvious disincentive for nations to send peacekeepers into the field and that damages the UN’s ability to carry out these functions.
It also damages the ability of the U.S. to try to protect our own interests at the UN. I’ve sat in meetings where I’ve been trying to push for a more responsible approach on a variety of peacekeeping operations, only to be told we’re not going to pay our bills anyway so I don’t really have a voice at this table. Now that only goes so far because we are on the Security Council and we do have a veto, and ultimately, the United States does have an enormous amount of sway in the United Nations, and for the most part we are able to protect our own interests.
Q: You were in the White House monitoring events and intelligence when genocide was unleashed in Rwanda. Could we have stopped it?
A: As President Clinton has said, we all regret not having done more at the time. It was one of the more devastating experiences for those of us at the White House as well as the international community, and first and foremost for the Rwandans. And I think we all wish we had done more. I obviously have thought a lot about this myself and have not really come to grips with exactly what steps would have been appropriate at the time. The secretary general [Kofi Annan] has put forward a ground-breaking report on this issue, as well as on Srebrenica [in Bosnia-Herzegovina], saying that, had we acted earlier with more troops, then perhaps we could have stemmed some of the genocide.
Q: Can you also talk about regional peacekeeping and how nations with an interest, not just the U.S., should take a more active role in their own regions–as we saw in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor.
A: Ultimately, the countries that are closest to a conflict have greater interest in that conflict. They’re going to be willing to move more quickly, take more casualties and cost than those that are farther away. In addition, the UN is not capable of fighting a war. So where you have warmaking tasks, the UN is not the appropriate body to take that task on. And what’s becoming clear, if you look at the recent history, the UN is not taking on enforcement roles.
Q: Can you talk about the idea of the rapid deployment force for the UN? Is it feasible?
A: Two ideas have been floating around for several years. One is the rapid-deployment force and the other is the UN standing army. On the UN standing army, I think it’s unrealistic to expect the UN to be able to manage an army. It’s a much better approach to have the international community work with nations to be able to provide to the UN on a timely basis a well-trained and well-equipped army. A rapidly deployable force is better handled by nations who are willing to respond to the call by the secretary general on a quick basis. In the case of Sierra Leone, when the secretary general called for quick, rapid reaction force, the British responded, and they went right in to Freetown, controlled the airport and stabilized the situation in a way that saved the UN from an even worse disaster. And they deserve great credit.
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This is an edited transcript.
