Last week, as Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat met in Israel for the first time since July’s peace talks at Camp David, and violence exploded on Temple Mount in Jerusalem, Dan Meridor was back at his post as chairman of the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. In July, Meridor was a key adviser to Barak during negotiations with the Palestinians at Camp David. After serving as finance minister and justice minister under Benjamin Netanyahu, Meridor helped found the Center Party, a part of Barak’s Labor-led coalition. He is considered a possible successor to Barak. Some of his views on the peace process, especially on the division of Jerusalem, are more conservative than those of the prime minister, who lost his majority in the Knesset after the July talks. Meridor visited Chicago last month, shortly after President Clinton met separately in New York with Arafat and Barak in an attempt to revive the peace talks.
Q: How would you describe the present status of the peace talks?
A: We’re at a crucial phase of the process, but the long-range perspective is very positive. The Oslo agreement signed in 1993 outlined a process in which the easy parts came first and the difficult ones were left–intentionally–for the final phase, where we are now. So it’s no surprise to me that it isn’t going smoothly. This is a very tough phase because the issues being negotiated are the most emotionally loaded and sensitive.
Q: Did Barak, as press leaks suggested, tentatively agree to sharing sovereignty in Jerusalem?
A: I don’t agree with the understanding that Barak would be ready to consider a division of the city of Jerusalem. I’m against it, I said I’m against it and I told Barak before we went there that I would speak against it if he agrees to that. The truth is that he did not say no to such a proposal. But not saying no may mean something, and I think it was wrong . . . I don’t think we should do it, and I don’t think it would work. To divide Jerusalem into several sovereignties seems crazy; it would not be the end of the conflict, it would be the beginning of endless conflicts. And the fact is that . . . Arafat said no, which means that even that was not enough. So either we give more, which I hope even Barak is not ready to do, or Arafat reconsiders his position, or there is no agreement.
Q: But in a practical sense, hasn’t the city of Jerusalem already been divided?
A: I wouldn’t describe it in those extreme terms. The fact that there are parts that are heavily inhabited by Arabs is true. The city has a variety of communities that don’t intermingle every day. But this is the way people choose to live. How many people, say, from midtown Manhattan go to Harlem every day? Does that make Harlem a different state?
Q: What do you think of the proposal that would allow Jews and Muslims to govern their own religious sites in the Temple Mount area, and leave sovereignty to God?
A: Under what law would it be governed? Who would enforce the law? Who has the building and zoning powers, and so on? What if somebody signs an agreement and then breaks it? If there’s an attack on Muslims or Jews, what police would you complain to? God is the sovereign of the entire world, why only of Temple Mount?
Q: But what if this idea brought you closer to a deal?
A: There is a price to pay for peace, and I understand this, and I’m ready to pay a price. During my whole life I believed we should retain the entire land of Israel and give the Arabs full civil rights, like everybody else. But we should be the sovereigns.
We gave them places like Bethlehem, or the large parts of Hebron, the first capital of Israel. I said yes, but a very painful yes. But there’s a limit to what you’re going to cut. From the religious perspective, Jerusalem is sacred. But so is Rome. So does it make sense, say, to make France or Poland the sovereigns of Rome? No, the French and the Poles go to Rome and they pray, but they aren’t the sovereigns of Rome. We are the sovereigns of Jerusalem, and we should stay the sovereigns of Jerusalem. In Jewish life, history and culture it is a center. After so many centuries, two millennia of hopes of returning to Jerusalem, when there was very little light in Jewish life, and now we should give it up? No way.
Q: How was public opinion affected by the rumors that Israel offered to divide the city?
A: The idea of giving up parts of Jerusalem, further outskirts, and even the Old City, almost caused a public opinion earthquake. People suddenly heard that maybe the Israeli leadership was ready to consider it.
Q: How do you read Arafat’s attitude in the negotiation process?
A: I can’t say I personally know him very well. And I don’t think those who do can say they know what he will do at the end. One says since Arafat is not very young and he was offered such a wonderful package, why can’t he say yes? But the same thing was asked about [Syrian President] Hafez Assad, and he died saying no. But some of the people on the Palestinian delegation could be desirous of reaching an agreement. Living with people for two weeks, day in, day out, it is hard not to notice that there is more than one opinion there. But he’s the one who calls the shots.
Q: What were the dynamics of the negotiations?
A: We had two very intense weeks in a very wonderful setting, extremely different from the Middle East–so green and full of water. The discussions were held in good spirits, but some of them were very emotional. You could see that the perspectives of the Arabs and the Jews on the whole conflict are just the opposite. One of the negotiators, a very intelligent guy, said, “you Israelis . . . all of a sudden, hundreds of thousands of your people came to our land and nobody asked us if we would allow you to come in.” To return to our land we don’t need to ask permission. But they said that with such a deep conviction, that a grave injustice was done to them. The two narratives were colliding, and it was very emotional and very deep. It was not just tactics. It may not prevent agreement at the end, but it’s deep. It’s their families, it’s my family. It’s not just a theoretical discussion.
Q: How is the question of time affecting the negotiations?
A: The Arab perspective for many centuries has been that time works for them . . . that in the long run they will have the upper hand. They ask, “How many are they? One, 2, 5 million? We are hundreds of millions. And what land do they have? That small land. So if we wait long enough, Israel will have to give up.” This was the basic Arab philosophy for many generations.
What happened was the opposite. If you look at time, the way we took advantage of time, we worked every day and every year to strengthen Israeli military and economic power, while the number of Jews coming in, which is the most important of all, grew–a million in the last decade from the Soviet Union. The Arab idea that they thought that they were going up, and Israel was going down, disintegrating, falling apart, it’s not the case. It’s just the opposite. Now they understand, “If I wait longer it will be more difficult for me.” In a very short time we’ll know where we stand. And this may go either to the best or the worst.
Q: What ideas were discussed to solve the refugee problem?
A: There were three claims by the Palestinians: one is that we accept responsibility for the problem. Barak said, “No, you created the problem, you started the war, we were always ready for agreement, you rejected every proposal and you are responsible.” This was left unresolved.
The second has to do with the right of return. They demanded that each one of them who left Israel in 1948 would be given a choice between returning and remaining. Returning, or going to where he or his parents or grandparents lived means, again, not the end of the conflict but the beginning of a new conflict. They never quoted a final number, but they talked of over 3 million refugees, over 370,000 of whom are in Lebanon and should be the first to be given the choice. Then of course, this thing will never fly.
I think something important changed when we said the solution will be to have two states in the West Bank, which means that the right of Jews to return to our historic homeland will be restricted to the areas that are Israel. Jews will give up the right–if there is an agreement–to go back to, say, Jericho, Bethlehem and other parts of the West Bank, which we think is ours. But the same principle, the right of Arabs to return, should be limited to the areas that will be a Palestinian state, not Israel.
If this is not accepted, and if what they want is to have a state, and then send people into Israel too, there will be no end to the conflict, and politically it would never pass with the Israeli public.
The third thing has to do with compensation or money. The Americans proposed that an international fund be established. The Palestinians wanted Israel to pay, so there’s a big difference here. And for what do you pay, and how much do you pay? This is a very complex issue, regarding compensation for being a refugee, money for rehabilitation, and money for the host countries, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. And as long as Syria has no negotiation process, how do you include them?
Even there, there was no beginning of an agreement. So I still see a gap, quite wide.
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This is an edited transcript.
