In “Cold War lesson: Hotheads prevail” (Perspective, June 2), senior correspondent R.C. Longworth warns against letting the war on terrorism degenerate into a hunt for scapegoats, “reinventing the worst times of the Cold War.” He tells how Sen. Joseph McCarthy “terrorized the nation for four years with accusations of communism in high places.”
Longworth does not seem to have lived through the same 1950s that I did. Yes, McCarthy demagogued–and terrorized hardly anybody. The media overflowed with fiery attacks on McCarthy and the “black pall of fear” that lay over the nation. Of course, the very fact that the media eagerly published these denunciations showed that they weren’t really afraid of McCarthy and his ilk. As one wag put it at the time, people “screamed at the top of their lungs that they weren’t allowed to speak above a whisper.”
Some history is in order: During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many Americans lost confidence in the capitalist system, and in their despair saw socialism and communism as attractive alternatives. In that climate, communist agents and sympathizers infiltrated the government very easily, meeting almost no resistance.
After World War II the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union became apparent, the Cold War started, and investigators began exposing and rooting out those infiltrators.
It wasn’t easy. Not only did the communist agents resist being exposed, those whom they had duped also ferociously resisted investigation of how they had been played for suckers. The terms “denial” and “stonewalling” were not yet in use, but they exactly fit what happened. All investigations were denounced as “witch-hunts” and assaults on civil liberties.
By far the worst effect of McCarthy’s demagoguery was that it gave a plausible excuse to those who wished to avoid any inquiry into communist infiltration into the government and other institutions. Every investigation was scornfully denounced as “McCarthyism.”
We now know, through opening of Soviet archives and other sources, that the infiltration was even more extensive than was thought during McCarthy’s time.
Longworth also mischaracterizes the uproar about “who lost China.” He says, “The American diplomats who warned, accurately, that the communists were about to conquer China were drummed out of government for their prescient honesty.” Untrue. What they were actually accused of was purposely slanting their reports and advice in order to make it easier for the communists to win.
And it wasn’t only diplomats. For example, the Institute of Pacific Relations, a private think-tank whose expertise was heavily relied upon by the State Department, was in effect a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Soviet Union. Owen Lattimore, editor of the IPR’s magazines, closely coordinated their content with Soviet officials to make sure that a pro-communist line was followed.
Longworth concludes that “It took the McCarthy era to show, once again, that super-patriotism poses a greater threat to the United States than any foreign adversary ever could, because they want us to give up our orneriness, which is another word for our liberties, without a fight.”
No, the McCarthy era showed that there is no limit to how stubbornly people will resist having their bad judgment exposed. It takes relentless investigators who can withstand the most indecent attacks on their integrity and character.
