If baseball players are going to go on strike again–and given the history, who would bet against it?–they will do it later rather than sooner. That’s good news because it provides time for union leader Donald Fehr to realize there’s a compromise staring him straight in the face.
Minimum payrolls, which thus far have not been a part of the bargaining, could wind up to be a major part of the solution. They are the missing piece of what Fehr refers to as the “mosaic” of proposals under consideration.
But before getting to the way to avoid athletic Armageddon, let’s discuss timing for a minute. It was very much in the news on Monday, mostly because of a Los Angeles Times story that reported Fehr and other lawyers with the Major League Baseball Players Association have “tentatively targeted” Sept. 16 as the likely strike deadline.
The report was knocked down by Fehr, top assistant Gene Orza and several player representatives. But most of the rebuttals said the union had not set a strike deadline, which, of course, was not what the Times had reported.
“The executive board has not considered a date,” Fehr said. “It won’t for a while. We hope we don’t have to. We hope we can reach an agreement.”
Who doesn’t? But that doesn’t mean the Times wasn’t correct when it wrote that a strike is most likely to happen around Sept. 16. Players who have attended recent briefings with Fehr have told reporters it’s unlikely a deadline will be set before the final weeks of the season. Whispers about Sept. 16 have been circulating for a week.
The truth is that date makes a lot of sense for the union. Not only does it get the players around the politics of Sept. 11 but it also keeps Fehr from having to make a very hard sell with his membership.
By setting a deadline of Aug. 12 in 1994, Fehr cost his players 7 1/2 weeks of paychecks. Many haven’t forgotten how he misjudged the owners’ willingness to weather an extended strike.
This time around, with the average salary having more than doubled, a player receiving the average salary (almost $2.4 million) earns more than $92,000 per week. That would add up to almost $700,000 per player in unrealized earnings if the season again ended on Aug. 12.
No, I don’t think Fehr wants to take a secret ballot and find out just how much support he would have for 1994 redux. The best thing that could happen for all parties is a settlement, and there just might be a way for Fehr to get one that feels like a victory without playing the usual game of chicken with management.
Fehr says the “central point” in negotiations is the amount of money transferred from the Yankees and other teams heavy in local broadcast revenues to teams farther down the line.
In terms of dollars, the sides really aren’t that far apart on revenue sharing. But that’s misleading by itself because the sides are on different planets in terms of both the method for revenue sharing–specifically, how much of a hit teams such as the Yankees, Mets and Dodgers will take–and the need for a luxury tax.
It appears Fehr is doing everything he can to protect the Yankees, and why wouldn’t he? Teams on the top end have driven baseball’s trickle-down economics. The problem is that with the increasing importance of local broadcasting revenues, their advantage becomes wider with every passing season, which is taking the fun out of the sport for fans in too many cities.
This was the point that Commissioner Bud Selig’s Blue Ribbon committee made so well in its 2000 report. Selig has called that report his “road map” for these negotiations, which raises one question–why aren’t we talking about minimum payrolls?
They were featured prominently in the report and should be part of the eventual solution.
Selig’s revenue-sharing proposals–including the tax, which is really another form of revenue sharing–could cost the Yankees an additional $50 million per season, if not more. That would be a major disincentive for their spending.
But with minimum payrolls, teams at the bottom would be required to spend more. No longer could Minnesota, Montreal or any other team take a welfare check and stick it into the owners’ bank account.
Just as importantly, teams in the middle, no longer as beaten down by the long odds of outperforming teams that can afford to outspend them, probably would decide to spend more. The result very well could be that just as much money would go toward player salaries, only by different teams.
Fehr scoffs at the suggestion that teams in the middle would spend more if teams at the top were spending less. But consider what has happened in recent years in the American League East.
Not so long ago, Baltimore and Toronto were big spenders. But after years of failing to catch New York, their owners decided to scale back the payroll.
Instead of scoffing, Fehr would be served better by opening his mind to the possibility that the system can be improved, even for players who are securing the wealth of their great grandchildren.
