The U.S. confrontation with North Korea brings to mind what hitting guru Charlie Lau said about hitting a knuckeball: There are two theories on how to do it–but neither works.
The Bush administration came into office determined to be firmer than its predecessor in dealing with the rulers of North Korea, who have no peers in the art of brinkmanship. But it’s learning that a hard-line approach doesn’t necessarily yield any better results than the Clinton administration’s policy of negotiation and engagement. It is also rediscovering the urgency of finding a policy that does work, which will not be easy but may be possible.
In October, the North Korean government admitted American charges that it had continued a clandestine nuclear weapons development program, in defiance of a 1994 agreement with Washington. The U.S. government thinks Kim Jong Il already has one or two bombs. Since going public on its program, North Korea has gone further, expelling international nuclear inspectors and starting to revive a nuclear complex that could be used to obtain weapons material. On Monday, the International Atomic Energy Agency demanded that North Korea comply with its international commitments.
Pyongyang, however, has called for direct talks with Washington, insisting that it needs further concessions to turn off the nuclear path. The Bush administration has refused, with Secretary of State Colin Powell declaring that the U.S. will “not capitulate to provocation by saying, `Let’s have negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior.’ “
That’s a sensible approach to dealing with a regime that has flouted its commitments. But unless the administration intends to give up hope of averting proliferation, more will be needed. It may be possible to afford Pyongyang a way out of its corner without rewarding its bad faith.
The South Korean government has floated the idea of getting the U.S. to adopt a non-aggression policy, something North Korea wants, as part of a deal to end the nuclear program. Done right, that approach could eliminate the greatest danger without giving up anything important, since the U.S. is clearly not about to invade the North.
Doing it right means putting the horse before the cart: letting Pyongyang know a security guarantee will be forthcoming only if, and only after, it implements the terms of the 1994 deal. The model is the Cuban missile crisis, when the Kennedy administration let Moscow know it would remove missiles from Turkey, if the Soviets first withdrew their missiles from Cuba. Getting North Korea to take that crucial step will require U.S. diplomacy in concert with South Korea, Russian and China–all of whom have an interest in a nuclear-free North Korea.
There is no guarantee of success. North Korea may be determined to become a nuclear power no matter what. But its neighbors should be working with Washington to make clear that it will pay a high price in economic and political isolation if it takes that road. The Bush administration should convey through third parties that if North Korea abides by its commitments, it has nothing to fear–and if it insists on going nuclear, it has nothing to gain.
