By Peter Graff
BENGHAZI, Libya, Sept 21 (Reuters) – A lack of basic
improvements to perimeter security at the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi made it an easy target for the attackers who stormed it
last week, killing a U.S. ambassador for the first time in 33
years.
The Libyan owners of the main villa rented by the diplomats
were surprised at how little, beyond some barbed wire and
security cameras, they added to the walled residential compound,
on a quiet street where volatile militiamen were free to roam.
Most striking was the absence of a second line of defence
inside the main gate on to the street; that left the few guards
in the compound little chance of holding off a crowd once the
gate, which showed no sign it had been forced, was swung open.
U.S. officials have yet to give a full account of the night
of Sept. 11-12 and the sack of the compound that served as the
consulate for Libya’s second city and the east of the country.
U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens was overcome by smoke
and died, trapped alone inside the burning villa after all the
other Americans withdrew. Another diplomat, Sean Smith, and two
U.S. security men were also killed that night.
The incident has become an election issue, with Republican
opponents accusing President Barack Obama’s government of
failing in the basic duty to keep the envoy safe.
The son of the owner of one of two villas making up the
consulate told Reuters that U.S. diplomats made few improvements
to its perimeter security since renting it last year. What was
added – barbed wire atop the garden walls and CCTV cameras –
were things that he, in common with many better off Libyans,
would have done for himself anyway as the fall of Muammar
Gaddafi’s police state brought a new lawlessness to Benghazi.
Crucially, given how a protest on the street was followed by
a crowd surging into the compound, the main entrance featured no
“air-lock” – a second internal gate, common to such official
compounds in hostile environments around the world, which can
trap intruders who force their way inside past the first guards.
That may, to some degree, reflect choices made by Stevens
himself: the ambassador’s many admirers say a low-key approach
to security was one of the factors that made him an unusually
effective diplomat in the Arab world, widely praised for being
both intrepid and approachable by those he wished to help.
Much of what happened that night – including the number of
attackers, their level of sophistication, the extent of planning
behind the raid and the degree to which it grew out of a small
protest against an anti-Muslim video filmed in the United States
– is either disputed or has yet to be determined.
But the facts that are not in dispute raise difficult
questions that could hover both over U.S. domestic politics in
the run-up to the Nov. 6 presidential election, and over the
ability of American diplomats to do their jobs in future in
Libya and other dangerous locations around the world.
DANGEROUS PLACE
The U.S. consulate in Benghazi had already been attacked by
bombers in June. Britain closed its own mission on the same
street after its ambassador survived a rocket attack on his
convoy, also in June. Other foreign outposts, such as that of
the Red Cross, have also come under attack.
While public opinion in Libya, and Benghazi in particular,
is broadly pro-American because of the U.S. role in supporting
the uprising that toppled Gaddafi, U.S. officials have warned of
a threat from Islamist militants training in camps in hills
nearby, including groups Washington says are linked to al Qaeda.
The attack fell on the anniversary of the 2001 attacks on
the United States, a date of particular security awareness.
With the U.S. embassy in neighbouring Egypt also the target
of angry demonstrators, a small protest in Benghazi began as the
sun was going down around 7 p.m. That was followed by an attack
by armed fighters. The consulate reported back to the embassy in
Tripoli at 9:35 p.m. that it was under heavy attack.
U.S. and Libyan officials have given varying accounts of
whether they believe the assault was planned in advance or grew
spontaneously out of the protest. Some Libyan security officials
have also suggested local guards may have let assailants in,
partly out of fear for their own safety and possibly hoping to
take the heat out of protests for which they had some sympathy.
Whatever the answers, the attackers would certainly have had
easy access to weapons and would not have needed much in the way
of a sophisticated battle plan to breach the compound defences.
NO MODIFICATIONS
The two villas and outhouses are surrounded by concrete
walls, twice the height of a man and more, topped with barbed
wire – standard features of middle-class housing in the region.
Mohammed Elipsheri, whose father owns one of the villas,
said: “I don’t think it was sufficient. We were going to add the
wire and cameras ourselves if we were going to keep living
there.”
Security expert Tim Ripley of Jane’s Defence Weekly said
such modifications might have been enough for a temporary,
occasional residence to be used by U.S. staff. But they were
inappropriate for a permanent mission flying the American flag.
“By having an overt American presence in Benghazi,” Ripley
said, “They were making it an obvious target for anti-American
groups, either demonstrators or more determined assailants.
“That would have warranted a more permanent and thorough
security arrangement rather than the temporary and ad hoc
structure that was in place.”
The main gate was manned by Libyans who had no secure
position from which to confront an assault. Inside, there were
neither towers nor firing positions for U.S. security personnel.
There were no U.S. troops, and, according to congressional staff
sources, just five American civilian security staff.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has defended
security arrangements, though her department’s officials have
declined to discuss specifics now that an official investigation
is under way. Clinton said relying on locals for perimeter
security was standard practice. But in other countries where the
United States has recently been at war, notably in Iraq or
Afghanistan, locals have little direct role.
Said Ripley: “Obviously there are questions about the risk
assessment made about the loyalty and efficacy of locally
recruited security staff in a country where the political
allegiances of many of the armed groups are uncertain.”
Fred Burton, a former special agent for the U.S. diplomatic
Security Service who now works for the Stratfor consultancy,
said there had been a “security failure” since the consulate
lacked “concentric rings” of protection typical at other sites.
Saying the villas were classed a “temporary facility” for
which normal security requirements had been waived, Burton
added: “You have very minimal kinds of standards and you
literally are flying by the seat of your pants. You’re on a wing
and a prayer, hoping that these kinds of events don’t happen.”
The main street entrance comprised a pair of metal gates
whose locks appeared undamaged when viewed by Reuters after the
attack and which showed little sign of being rammed or shot at.
Intruders who swarmed inside had a clear run over well-tended
lawns to reach the buildings housing the U.S. diplomats.
Even if the guards did not open the gate, a single assailant
making it over a wall in the dark might have easily flung the
entrance wide open in seconds. Journalists saw evidence of a
hasty attempt to mount a defence in front of the diplomatic
buildings – sandbags were piled in front of one, but stacked
haphazardly not built into a well-constructed firing position.
AMBASSADOR
Stevens, 52, was based in the capital Tripoli but often
visited Benghazi, where he was held in high regard – as attested
to by wreaths laid at the consulate since his death. He was
respected not least for his willingness to be approachable to
the locals and to venture where other officials feared to tread.
How far his manner was reflected in security preparations is
unclear. His own fate, separated from his bodyguard in the
confusion, is another perplexing element for U.S. investigators.
Washington has yet to disclose precisely when and how the
other American personnel were evacuated to a safe location at
another villa nearby, bringing with them the body of Smith who
was killed in the initial attack.
A U.S. rescue party was flown to Benghazi airport. At some
point these rescuers and their Benghazi militia escort also came
under attack, including, Libyans say, from well-aimed mortar
fire. Extracting the survivors was also delayed by a lack of
transport after confusion over how many Americans were there.
That second assault has given rise to speculation that the
whereabouts of the safe house had been leaked, although it is
also possible that were simply followed or spotted.
Initial accounts from U.S. officials say the two other
Americans were killed during the rescue.
Left at the villa, Stevens was found when the flames had
died down and a crowd of looters and curious youths wandering
through the compound forced their way past shutters into what
may have been a “panic room”, designated for emergency use.
Extensive cellphone video from local witnesses shows those
who recovered him seemed concerned with trying to save his life.
Clothing store employee Yahya al-Furjani, 20, said he was
among scores who showed up after the violence as word of the
incident spread. Furjani, who appears in some of the footage,
clambered into the cramped, smoke-filled room where the diplomat
lay on the floor between a bed and door. The young Libyan shone
a light from his cellphone at the body and saw from the fair
hair that it was a foreigner, covered in soot.
He was sure the man was dead, but still held out hope.
“This destroyed our revolution,” Furjani said of the attack,
after watching video of himself carrying Stevens outside. “The
Americans stood with us in our revolution. I wish I could carry
this body back to America to let people there know that those
people do not represent Benghazi. I represent Benghazi.”
(Editing by Alastair Macdonald)
