Chrysler CEO Robert Eaton called it a “sterling example” of government and industry collaboration. Vice President Al Gore, in a ceremony in which he gave medals to a handful of Supercar engineers, indicated the program was ahead of schedule.
But in truth, the project was neither ahead of schedule nor a standard of cooperation.
Turf wars were breaking out, with Gray building his own car and the Big Three pursuing theirs. Energy Department officials thought they could run the program better than the Commerce Department, and Commerce officials thought Energy officials weren’t fully sharing information.
Moreover, project leaders repeatedly were ignoring recommendations by a panel of independent experts from the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences. The panel reviewed Supercar’s progress and made recommendations in annual reports.
For example, Supercar officials took more than two years to conduct a study that the review panel thought should have done immediately. Called a “systems analysis,” the study was to help scientists determine what kinds of changes would be needed to make a family sedan achieve 80 miles per gallon.
But the Big Three argued against the study, saying each company already had such analyses, according to government Supercar officials. Yet the automakers refused to share the results with their government partners, saying they were company secrets.
“We kept saying, ‘It doesn’t matter whether you think that is proprietary or not; it’s got to be done,'” recalls Craig Marks, a member of the review panel.
Eventually, the government hired an outside company to do the work. But by then, more than two years had passed.
And soon, at the end of 1997, it was decision time: Project leaders had to pick the most promising technologies for Supercar. It was the first formal deadline in the program and perhaps the biggest decision of the effort.
Despite all the talk about hydrogen fuel cells, ultracapacitors and other space-age technologies, project leaders concluded that the most promising technology for an 80-mile-per-gallon car was a diesel engine.
Though diesels were about 30 percent more fuel efficient than gasoline engines, they also were notoriously loud, smelly and a major contributor to smog.
But given the time constraints, a diesel hybrid–a half-diesel, half-electric car–was the best shot to achieve the mileage goal, Supercar officials decided.
The diesel decision was largely the automakers’ call.
They were the ones officially building Supercar, and they told their government partners that diesels were their choice. Though some government officials worried about the emissions, they acquiesced.
Commerce’s Good had to convince Gore that diesels were a proper choice and that scientists would make them cleaner. “This is not your grandfather’s diesel,” she recalls telling him.
But Supercar officials were low-key about the diesel decision. They decided not to hold a big news conference or celebration as they had with previous Supercar milestones.
Instead, they sent out press releases to a handful of media outlets. They did not use the word “diesel” in their announcement, but rather broader terminology, such as “hybrid-electric vehicle drive.”
The low-key strategy worked. The diesel decision received virtually no media coverage.
The story continues… Competition from Tokyo
