The Soviet deep cut arms proposal is turning out to be just about what you would expect. It appears to be as one-sided as it was bold. It is designed to leave the United States worse off in the strategic balance than it is today, and it might even undermine the stability of the nuclear standoff.
Simply reducing arsenals by half does not necessarily reduce the danger of nuclear war, let alone work to the interest of the United States. The key is what is left. For example, the Soviets have relied on big, land-based multiple warhead missiles. If the number of warheads on each side were cut in half, the Soviets would have to eliminate fewer missiles than the United States, which has not put as many warheads in nose cones as the Soviets have. This kind of cut would not increase the stability of the nuclear balance because it would leave both the United States and the Soviet Union at least as vulnerable to a first strike as they are today.
But the answer to the Soviets` one-sided proposal is to make a counteroffer, one that creates incentives for both sides to move away from multiple warhead missiles, if not away from ground-based systems altogether. The combination of multiple warhead deployments and the reliance on vulnerable, ground-based launchers has made world peace more precarious. It would be a stunning arms control achievement to reverse that trend.
A multiple warhead missile in a fixed silo presents a threat to the other side because it is accurate enough to destroy opposing missiles in the ground. It is also an inviting target because a couple of incoming warheads can destroy a great number of warheads in the silo before they are fired. This makes it more tempting to push the button in a crisis, for fear of suffering a crippling first strike or in the hopes of inflicting one.
The U.S. position ought to be to structure cuts in such a way that it no longer makes sense for either side to depend on this kind of weapon. The Soviets, whose taste in these matters has always run to big, heavy, land-based behemoths, undoubtedly would resist such a suggestion. But that should be the beginning of negotiations rather than the end of them.
Calling ”Star Wars” non-negotiable is a different matter entirely. Administration officials are right to point out that a ban on all ”Star Wars” research would be unworkable. The United States could not verify that the Soviets were living up to their promise, and it certainly isn`t going to base its policy on trust.
But the United States should not rule out all restrictions. There are many levels at which limitations could be imposed: moratoriums on testing, for example. At this stage, it is pure science fiction to suggest that the United States can put up some kind of an invisible shield that would offer any real protection for the cities. The best strategic reason for considering defensive systems is to protect vulnerable land-based missile silos. And the same result can be achieved more expeditiously by arms control.
In addition to the purely military issues, there are strong economic reasons for both sides to seek limitations on expensive nuclear arsenals. In this respect, deep cuts are especially appealing, though the initial consequence of a first-rate deal might be the building of a new Midgetman-style, single-warhead missle.
The administration ought to call the Soviets` bluff and respond with its own 50 percent solution to the arms race. This makes both strategic and political sense, because a serious counteroffer would take the United States off the public relations defensive. The only risk the administration could possibly see in this appraoch is that the Soviets might accept.
