King Hussein`s rhetoric was masterful. Trying to sell his beleaguered four-point Mideast peace plan to congressional skeptics, he announced the unimaginable–willingness to negotiate directly with the Israelis, as well as the Chinese, Americans, Palestinians, Russians, Syrians, Lebanese, French, British, Egyptians and a Peruvian. The skeptics were not impressed.
Underlying the Jordanian king`s salesmanship is a hidden agenda for gaining a commitment to a long-term program of American support. But those siding with Hussein, believing the current scenario can do what Camp David could not–settle the Palestinian issue–only help to expose the
vulnerabilities of his regime. By refusing to jettison two flawed assumptions, they weaken the king`s stability.
False assumption No. 1: Hussein is the moderate and Yasser Arafat is the radical. In fact, Hussein will prove to be a much more difficult negotiating partner than the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. For Arafat, the tactical alignment with Hussein is his last chance to gain any territory from Israel. His constituency has dwindled, and with it has gone the political will to say no if a slice of the West Bank were offered to him.
But Hussein is claiming for himself the mantle of interlocutor not just for Jordanians and Palestinians but for all Arabs and Moslems. Indeed, for many in the Middle East, Israel`s control over the Islamic holy places is the most poignant aspect of the occupation. Saudi princes, Kuwaiti bankers and
–lest we forget–Jordanian Moslem brothers care more about Jerusalem than Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem combined.
Even if Israel were to offer to return the entire West Bank to Jordan but refused to accept a change in the status of the holy places, King Hussein would reject it. For him to do otherwise is unthinkable. As he said at the United Nations, Jerusalem remains the ”key to peace.”
False assumption No. 2: Solving the Palestinian issue is Jordan`s top priority. On the contrary, regime stability has always been and will remain Hussein`s chief concern, and the maintenance of Hashemite rule is much more intertwined with the foundering state of the Jordanian economy than with tempting the fates by negotiating the status of the occupied territories.
Today, 15 years after the bloody civil war, there is no Palestinian insurrectionary threat to the regime. Not only does Hussein`s internal security apparatus deserve its reputation for efficiency, but–more important –a large segment of Jordan`s own Palestinian population has acquired a firm stake in the survival of the monarchy. Whatever his reasons, Hussein is not acting out of national priority or fear of Palestinian national restlessness.
Why then is Hussein asking the United States to catalyze the peace process, accept his agenda and move toward an international conference?
Because he has little to lose and lots of aid–financial and military–to gain.
Jordan has one of the world`s only ”non-oil-exporting oil economies.”
During the 1970s, the economy boomed, fueled primarily by support from Persian Gulf states and remittances from the hundreds of thousands of Jordanians working on Gulf development projects. But today, three years after the bust in oil prices, only reserve-rich Saudi Arabia meets its aid commitments, and thousands of jobless doctors, engineers and construction workers are returning home. Jordan needs new sources of funds to help keep thousands of workers off the streets and keep the country solvent.
Hussein`s plan is to place on American shoulders the onus of maintaining the illusion of momentum toward peace. In his eyes, taking the first step toward an international conference–a meeting between the U.S. and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation–would go far toward satisfying congressional concerns about his willingness to take risks for peace.
With White House support, it is argued, Congress would not balk on aid to Jordan while the ”process” is in motion. Meanwhile, in the Arab world, Hussein would be hailed as the Arab leader who secured U.S. recognition of the PLO, which is undoubtedly how the Arab press would portray a meeting between the U.S. and the joint delegation.
Jordan could then avoid making any true concessions by opting out of the process at any one of the nearly insurmountable obstacles already laid across the path to peace. Nobody knows, for example, if the king would stand firm against U.S. objections to Soviet participation in an international conference, or if Jordan would attend the proposed conference if Syria refused an invitation. Blame for the failed initiative would fall elsewhere and Hussein would retain his moderate, risk-taking image.
On the other hand, if the U.S. refused to meet the delegation, Hussein would charge the White House with torpedoing the last chance for solving the Palestinian issue. The king would move closer to the Arab consensus, patch up differences with Syria and lobby the Gulf states for more aid. Jordan, which already owes the U.S. more than it owes any other country (including Saudi Arabia), prefers the American option, because it believes U.S. commitments are more reliable than Arab promises. But Hussein would take what he could get.
Before the Reagan administration tries again to tackle the Palestinian issue, it must ask itself two questions. First, is it willing to accept Hussein`s agenda and finance Jordan through a period of high unemployment and deepening recession?
After the U.S. committed itself to the peace initiative by meeting with the joint delegation, Hussein would have ample opportunity to stall until he saw a massive infusion of aid forthcoming from Washington. The $250 million economic aid package rushed through Congress in June was more than offset by the cancellation of Kuwaiti support in July; the contemplated billion-dollar military aid deal is only a down payment on the much larger economic aid request Jordan is sure to make soon. Amman needs the financial aid more desperately than the F-20 fighters and the anti-aircraft missiles, but Hussein considers approval of the weapons sale a symbol of the administration`s resolve to support his regime.
The second question the U.S. must answer is: Is there hope for movement on the key issue of Jerusalem? Unless the White House is convinced that headway on Jerusalem is possible, it is fooling itself in believing that substantial progress can be made in the overall peace process. Hussein may receive more aid, but a failed U.S.-Jordan-Palestinian initiatve can only heighten the danger of Islamic radicalism.
Both issues–aid to Jordan and the centrality of the holy places in Jerusalem–must be examined before the U.S. decides whether to meet the joint delegation and commit itself to the Hussein plan.
