Saudi Arabia has fired the opening shot in a new diplomatic offensive against Iran, but political analysts around the Persian Gulf think the initial round was a blank instead of a bullet.
The unprecedented attack started with a diplomatic move to isolate Iran in the Arab world and soon escalated into a highly publicized tongue-lashing of Iran by powerful Saudi officials, including one at a Saudi Arabian press conference, which is about as rare as a martini in the kingdom, where liquor is banned.
Officially, Western diplomats welcomed the offensive by Riyadh, whose goal ostensibly is to ”convince” Tehran that it should end the seven-year Iran-Iraq war. They hope the Saudi campaign will force Iran to join Iraq in accepting a United Nations resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.
As a result of the Saudi pressure, the normally divided 21-member Arab League has given Iran until Sept. 20 to accept the cease-fire or jeopardize its relations with the league.
Ideally, the cease-fire would lower tension in the gulf, where thousands of American sailors are now stationed aboard an armada of U.S. warships escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.
But privately, many diplomats doubt the Saudi offensive will be successful in its present form.
”I can tell you this,” said one diplomat who has contacts in Iran. ”I don`t care what the Arab League does. The Iranians will never accept this cease-fire in its current form. They would lose face, and they can`t do that. Something will have to change.”
The diplomat said he thinks the Saudis actually are trying to ”inspire” an Iranian diplomatic proposal to end the war. Iran is to meet this week with UN Sec. Gen. Javier Perez de Cuellar to discuss its position.
”Maybe the Iranians will settle for another resolution that says Iraq started the war and that Iran is entitled to war reparations. The Saudis and the other Arab states could contribute to the fund. They could just pay them off and end it. That`s the way things usually work in this part of the world,” he said.
But he and other diplomats confessed to being puzzled and concerned about the Saudis` unusual public campaign and its impact on Iran.
”Everyone knows when you corner someone, he has to fight,” one diplomat said.
None of the diplomats questioned was optimistic that the Saudi campaign would lead to an end to the hostilities.
”I think the Saudis had to do something. They were big backers of the Security Council (cease-fire) resolution, and they couldn`t just sit there. But I don`t think it is going to work,” said one Western diplomat.
He said he thinks the Iranians will continue to stall because Iran is benefiting tremendously from the lull in the tanker war.
Iran relies exclusively on the Persian Gulf to ship its oil. But Iraq, which pumps its oil through pipelines, has succumbed to Western pressure and has stopped attacking oil tankers calling on Iranian ports until Iran says whether it will accept the UN cease-fire.
So far, Iran has not accepted or rejected the measure.
”They are just pumping oil like crazy and filling up their coffers with the money they need to buy arms,” the diplomat said.
”I think they will just continue to stall. Sept. 20 will come and go, and Iraq will say, `Okay, that`s enough. We showed some restraint, but no one else is trying.` Iraq will then resume its attacks on Iran`s tankers, and the whole thing will escalate again.”
Another Western diplomat said he would be very skeptical if Iran suddenly agreed to the call for a cease-fire. He said he would wonder if Tehran had decided simply to switch tactics for a while and fight the war through some other means, such as an Iranian-inspired terrorist campaign.
There are several reasons why diplomats here are so skeptical that the Saudi offensive will lead to a cease-fire. But the main one involves the complex politics of the Middle East.
The enormous oil wealth of Saudi Arabia makes it a powerful influence in the Arab world. But Saudi influence also is limited by ancient tribal rivalries and the regional interests of major powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Saudis` role in the Arab League ultimatum to Iran is a classic example of that process at work.
The league has been so divided on Arab issues that it has not held a full summit since 1982 because of wide political rifts among its members.
Yet, under pressure from the Saudis, even league supporters of Iran, such as Syria and Libya, voted for an ultimatum to Iran. If Iran doesn`t react, the league has threatened to sever Arab ties with Tehran, a move Iran wants to avoid.
A key element in the Arab League vote was Saudi Arabia`s role in convincing Syria to go along with the others.
Syrian leader Hafez Assad is beholden to Saudi Arabia for huge injections of economic aid at a time when he is struggling with severe economic problems at home.
Diplomats said the Saudis, angered at Iran because of its role in the riots last month in the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia that left hundreds dead, simply decided to cash their checks with Assad.
But the league vote also demonstrates the limits of Saudi influence.
Syria didn`t go along with the stronger measure that the Saudis initially advocated to the league. That proposal, which also was backed in private lobbying by such moderate Arab states as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco but opposed by Oman and Algeria, according to political sources, called for an immediate break in relations with Iran.
The measure ultimately passed by the league was a watered-down version that bought Iran some time.
None of the diplomats questioned thought Syria would actually vote to sever ties with Iran if Tehran failed to accept the cease-fire. Since the league probably would not act without a unanimous vote, the Syrians could block the resolution.
Under some scenarios, the Saudis could pressure Syria by threatening to restrict economic aid to Assad.
But the Saudis are notoriously conservative people. They pay the aid, said Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert who has written extensively on Saudi Arabia, to ensure that Syria`s political radicalism never becomes a hostile threat to the Saudi kingdom.
As a result, they would undoubtedly be constrained by the realities of the military balance between the two nations.
The Syrians have received massive infusions of Soviet military aid designed to counter U.S. aid to Israel. Syria has an active armed force of 402,000 men, 4,200 tanks and 583 combat aircraft compared to a Saudi force of 62,000 men, 450 tanks and 205 aircraft.
A mere decision to restrict aid obviously would not prompt Damascus to attack Saudi Arabia. But the huge imbalance in force levels between the two nations graphically demonstrates the limits of Riyadh`s influence on Syria, a nation that would have to play a key role in pressuring Iran to accept a cease-fire it didn`t want.
Some diplomats say that the escalation of U.S. forces here is another constraining factor in the Saudi campaign to win a cease-fire.
Iranian leaders, they say, could lose vast influence among their population and Shiite Moslems in other Middle East nations if it appears that Tehran accepted a cease-fire under pressure from the Saudis or because of the military escalation in the Persian Gulf by America, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini`s ”Great Satan.”
”You have to look at it from Iran`s side,” said one diplomat. ”Iran has to get something so they can go back to the people and tell them, `We ended it because we won something.` Otherwise, how could they tell their people all of those deaths were in vain.”
Another big constraint is that the ultimate penalty Iran faces for rejecting the cease-fire resolution is an arms embargo that everyone views as unenforceable, assuming it would even be passed by the UN Security Council. Two of the council`s five permanent members, the Soviet Union and China, already have reacted coolly to scheduling a vote to impose an embargo.
