Since 1948 the Middle East has been plunged into five wars that have nearly all produced profound changes in the political map of the region but have failed to resolve its basic problem.
The sixth war, now under way, may be no different.
It is too early to predict what the postwar map will look like. But one consequence of the war seems inevitable: a rise in political extremism that will manifest itself in acts of terrorism and pressure on moderate Arab regimes.
At least three parties seem likely to pay a political price from the war: the United States, the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Those that could benefit are Israel and, to some extent, Kuwait.
For other parties, the picture is not clear.
From the beginning, the choices for the U.S. were not palatable. It could fail to stand up to Iraqi aggression and see its credibility in the world undermined and some of its vital interests threatened. Or it could make a stand and risk a further erosion of sympathy in the Arab world.
It chose the second course, and as a result this war is in one sense different from any other. It is the first war in which Americans have been involved directly in killing Arabs.
Some Western diplomats already are speculating that this could profoundly affect the U.S. role in the Middle East for at least a generation.
The position of the U.S. in Arab thinking is complex. Many Arabs admire American values, respect American strength and see the U.S. as the chief arbiter of their lives.
If the Arab world remains backward and the region torn by perpetual conflict, it is, many believe, because the U.S. refuses to use its weight to resolve the region`s basic problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The U.S. has weathered Arab rage after previous wars, and continued to play an influential role, because the Arabs are politically impotent and have not finally abandoned hope in a U.S. mediating role. But this war could produce a more profound trauma in the Arab psyche than past conflicts.
The three-year intifada, or Palestinian uprising, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip used to be seen as the Arabs` best hope of involving the U.S. and Israel in a regional peace settlement.
In 1989 the U.S. brought Israel to the brink of serious negotiations, then, in the Arab view, let the opportunity slip away. As the Arabs saw it, the U.S. acquiesced in Israeli intransigence and in violations of
international law on such matters as Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, demolition of Arab homes and expulsion of Palestinians.
The U.S. sought to separate the issue of Iraq`s occupation of Kuwait from this larger problem, but it failed to convince the Arab masses. Hussein has skillfully exploited an Arab perception that the U.S. applies double standards in the region-willing to punish an Arab occupation regime but not an Israeli one.
Some Arab governments will draw satisfaction from a crushing defeat for Hussein. But for the man in the street, such an outcome will be yet another mortifying blow to Arab pride and self-respect.
Throughout their recent history, the Arabs have been in search of a hero. They measure this not in terms of devotion to democracy or economic development but in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict: Who can right the wrongs Israel has inflicted, or at least force the Israelis to a settlement?
For a time, the late Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt wore the hero`s mantle. Hussein, with his chemical weapons and huge army, seemed to many the most likely successor; no other Arab leader so worried the Israelis.
Hussein has achieved the distinction of uniting behind him both left-wing nationalists and conservative Islamic fundamentalists. Palestinians in particular have embraced him.
If he is defeated decisively, Arab rage and frustration will be directed first at the U.S. and secondly at those Arab governments that supported the U.S. in the war. It is too early to say if any of those regimes will be overthrown, but pressures on them will be intense.
Kuwait will have its sovereignty restored, and in this respect it will be one of the few winners. But it and other Persian Gulf states may prove too weak to stand without a permanent Western military presence, and in the case of Saudi Arabia especially, this carries grave risks.
The feudal, closed Saudi society seems likely to be transformed by its contact with Western ways, and either the regime will change with it or probably disappear.
If he survives, Hussein will emerge from the war a hero and martyr to many Arabs.
But, if he is shorn of his military strength and faced with the task of rebuilding a shattered country, his influence will wane. He, or a successor regime, may be more immediately preoccupied with fending off groups seeking to dismember Iraq-rapacious Iranians and independence-minded Kurds-than with threatening Israel.
Israel could be the biggest winner from the war. The threat that Hussein posed will have been eliminated, and pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization could be lessened by the fact that the PLO`s support for Iraq has cost it dearly in the West.
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat could finally be on his way out. The assassination last week of his close aide Saleh Khalaf (better known as Abu Iyad) leaves Arafat and Farouk Kaddoumi as the only important remaining figures of the PLO founding generation, and Arafat has become increasingly irrelevant to many young PLO militants, especially in the occupied
territories.
Arafat has shown an uncanny ability to come back from adversity in the past, but this time that seems less likely. A younger generation seems poised to take over the PLO.
As for the U.S., it might be able to salvage its position in the Arab world if, after crushing Iraq, it then brings the full weight of its political influence to bear to achieve a settlement of the Middle East`s basic problem. But that seems unlikely to happen. Historically, the U.S. has been unwilling to demand of Israel the concessions required for a Middle East settlement, and it is faced with a right-wing government in Jerusalem that may come out of the war more determined than ever not to yield any ground.
The Bush administration has shown impatience with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir`s government, but no willingness to enter into a real confrontation with it, and there is no reason to think this will change.
The PLO`s current low standing in U.S. public opinion further removes any incentive for the U.S. to adopt a more evenhanded policy in the Middle East.
The Soviet Union, which once was a major player in the region, has been marginalized since it became preoccupied with its internal problems and lost some of its appetite for arming radical regimes.
It has managed to protect its interests by refusing to send men or equipment to join the anti-Iraq military coalition and thus should come out of the war in a position to try to rebuild its influence.
But it is still hobbled by its lack of formal relations with Israel and thus cannot play a determining role.
