Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill
By Jessica Stern
Ecco/HarperCollins, 368 pages, $27.95
The setting and format of the fourth annual White Rose Banquet, at a Holiday Inn in suburban Washington, D.C, could be that of any do-good organization. But the similarity with your local hospital fundraiser ends there.
“Saints in bonds”–men and women serving prison time for murder or attempted murder of doctors who perform abortions–have provided “relics” for an auction. The relics include garments a female prisoner has knitted, all in camouflage. The master of ceremonies jokes that if you have this clothing, government agents won’t be able to find you.
The Army of God, says one of the inspirational leaders of the anti-abortion movement, is poised for its righteous mission: “[T]here will be skilled assassins and skilled saboteurs after the abortion industry, which is not only the abortionists but also the people on top of them, including Supreme Court judges.” Before everyone goes home, they sing “Jesus Shall Reign.”
The banquet is a bizarre, terrifying scene in its own right. But it is all the more frightening because it is part of a worldwide pattern in which people who believe themselves to be perfectly good brutalize the innocent, as Jessica Stern shows us in her revealing anatomy of religious terrorism, “Terror in the Name of God.”
Stern, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, is one of our foremost experts on terrorism. Her study of its inner workings is based on far-flung and often intrepid interviewing that included followers of Jewish extremists dedicated to wresting the Temple Mount in Jerusalem from Muslim control, a militant Indonesian cleric who wants Muslims to feel ” `safe in their own country,’ ” and the South African-raised wife of a leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, affiliated with the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, formed by Osama bin Laden.
“We need to assess why bin Laden’s and other extremists’ ideas spread,” Stern writes. “And we need to look for clues globally.”
Stern substantiates what we have known for some time: Terrorism’s foot soldiers, the men and women who blow themselves up in public places, tend to be lost souls.
Sometimes they are overwhelmed and confused by social change, such as that occurring in Indonesia, and yearn for stability. Militant religious groups offer discipline and a clear sense of purpose.
Sometimes they see no job ahead of them and have little prospect of marriage or a family of their own. Membership in terrorist groups offers prestige and money, not only for the individual but also their families. Hamas gives subsidized apartments to Palestinian students and annuities to the families of suicide bombers.
” `These guys kill Israelis,’ ” an activist notes, ” `but they also secure their families from poverty.’ “
Drawing on recent scholarly interest in leadership, Stern analyzes the different ways terrorism is organized and directed. At one end of the spectrum are networks in which operatives are inspired to take action on their own. At the other end, commander-cadre organizations provide training and financial support, and detailed direction.
Although terrorists have special grievances and goals, they perceive a common threat in globalism. “Al Qaeda’s complaints about the new world order sound remarkably similar to [anti-abortionist] Kerry Noble’s,” Stern says. That new world order is seen as promoting a decadent consumer culture and irresponsible individualism–the latter expressed especially in feminism–which destroy traditional values.
” `It is important to realize that capitalism is also an ideology just like Islam,’ ” says a member of a Pakistani jihadi group named Lashkar e Taiba (Army of the Pure). ” `The West is trying to force its capitalist ideology onto Islamic states.’ “
Terrorists view globalism as the enemy but make good use of the communication apparatus that makes globalism possible. The Internet is used to attract recruits, orchestrate attacks and raise money. Virtual networks, made possible by the Internet, Stern notes, “enable violent individuals who are socially ill at ease to work together on a common political or religious cause without having to meet face-to-face.”
Fundraising is a vital part of terrorism. The auction of relics at the White Rose Banquet is designed to raise money for the families of “saints in bonds.” The take at the banquet is minuscule compared to the overall flow of terrorist funds, which amounts to billions and has made many terrorist organizations into big businesses.
Bin Laden was a major employer in Sudan, when he lived there from 1991 to 1996 and built a major highway for the country. Terrorist operatives often are well paid. Some receive bonuses for good work.
” `I thought they were true Muslims,’ ” one Pakistani militant says to Stern about terrorist organizations with which he has worked, ” `but now I believe that they are fraud, they are selling Islam as a product.’ ” Yet he stayed at his job. ” `First I was there for jihad, now I am there for my financial reasons.’ “
Like any smart business executives, terrorist leaders have altered their missions to attract more money. A notable case, which Stern relates, involves Ayman Zawahiri. In order to get funds from bin Laden, Zawahiri switched the focus of his work from attacking the secular rulers in his home country of Egypt to jihad against the U.S. Zawahiri eventually became bin Laden’s deputy.
Governments, including our own, have given critical support to terrorist organizations. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia provided $3.5 billion to mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In doing so, they helped create “a multinational jihadi organization, which eventually evolved into the biggest threat to U.S. national security,” Stern writes.
“The growing availability of powerful weapons, porous borders, and the communications revolution make it possible for smaller and smaller groups to wreak havoc almost anywhere on the globe,” says Stern, who worked for the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton.
Unfortunately, Stern has little to say about strategies for coping with homegrown terrorists such as those attending the White Rose Banquet. But she offers thoughtful observations on dealing with threats from foreign terrorists.
A major problem, she wisely notes, is countering threats without making the problem worse. Policy remedies typically concentrate on attacking terrorists. Because terrorists have widely dispersed networks, one attack normally does not wipe out an organization. Instead, it draws attention to the terrorists and helps them recruit others to their ranks.
Better solutions, Stern argues, lie in determined but subtle policies. The U.S. must promote development abroad, for poverty is a breeding ground for terrorists. It must find ways to penetrate organizations like Al Qaeda just as Al Qaeda has penetrated the U.S. It must make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire weapons, including weapons of mass destruction.
Stern chides the Bush administration’s tendency toward unilateralism, which hampers international cooperation to deal with terrorism. The U.S., Stern says, must “take public relations and public education as seriously as the terrorists do” (this sentence as published has been corrected in this text).
“We need to respond–not just with guns–but by seeking to create confusion, conflict, and competition among terrorists and between terrorists and their sponsors and sympathizers.”
