On July 22, the U.S. Congress unanimously condemned the slaughter in Sudan’s western province of Darfur as “genocide.” Some American Jewish groups concurred. A month before, Secretary of State Colin Powell described the situation as a “humanitarian catastrophe.” On Aug. 9, a European Union fact-finding group concluded the atrocities didn’t quite add up to genocide. Some human rights groups prefer “crimes against humanity.”
The fact no one contests–except for the Sudanese government–is that since the fighting began about 18 months ago, as many as 50,000 people have been killed, about 1 million left homeless and another 2.2 million are in dire need of food and other aid.
Another fact is that unless international and regional organizations, the U.S. or EU, act to end the killing, tens of thousands more will die.
“The genocide debate is a diversion,” said Ken Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. “Crimes against humanity, large-scale slaughter, what difference does it make?”
What’s desperately needed is for the world community to go from semantics to action. One step, the easiest, is to massively increase humanitarian and food aid to the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. So far, the U.S. has delivered most of the aid.
The second step–far more definitive and difficult–is to compel Sudan to accept a force, ideally made up of fellow African nations, to rein in the savage freelance armies that are killing, raping and terrorizing the people of Darfur.
Darfur’s plunge into darkness began as an uprising against the central government in Khartoum, already battling a similar rebellion by other ethnic groups in the south. Rather than confront the Darfurian rebels directly, Khartoum opted for proxies to do the killing–the Janjaweed, or “men on horseback”–with logistical and material support from the government.
Tales abound of atrocities, but beyond largely symbolic acts, world action to force Sudan to rein in the Janjaweed has been mired in debates over international law and politics. Some real but unspoken reasons behind this inaction are the sheer size of Sudan–the largest country in Africa–and its resources, notably oil.
The Bush administration, and particularly Powell, have devoted considerable time to finding a political solution. But certainly the U.S. is not prepared to use American troops and open yet another military front.
That reality has taken the debate to the UN Security Council, where even U.S. initiatives to use sanctions–one of the mildest rebukes–have met Chinese and Russian opposition.
Sudan warns it will not allow any intervention in its internal affairs. In a gross act of cynicism, its response to the UN has been to deputize some Janjaweed to go after their own ilk. A move Thursday by Sudan to appoint tribal leaders to disarm the Janjaweed is no more credible.
The only outside group with troops in Sudan–about 300 soldiers and observers–is the African Union, which says it could step up its involvement. Politically and logistically, this is the best hope of controlling the Janjaweed.
The UN ought to pressure Sudan to accept an all-African force to stop the Janjaweed. The UN could declare too that if Sudan is not ready to control the Janjaweed, it has an obligation to let someone else do so.
Among difficult options on the table, this offers the best promise. The worst option–one that ought to be unacceptable to the world–is to sit by arguing while the slaughter continues.
