By chance the other day, I saw Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on C-SPAN. Normally, I do not watch TV. As a result of the briefing Rumsfeld was giving at the Pentagon, I learned that the 34 years I spent soldiering, and the 40-plus years I have spent reading military history, were all for naught.
At the end of the briefing, Rumsfeld said, “One last question,” and pointed to an Asian. I don’t think he realized she was a reporter from South Korea. That notwithstanding, her question was along the lines of this: Did he not think that he was creating a risky situation in South Korea by withdrawing forces and sending them to Iraq?
Before she could even finish the question, the secretary began to explain to her how wrong she was. He told her two things that really struck home with me. The first was that she obviously did not understand modern warfare. He explained to her that in the 21st Century, less was better than more. He said she needs to understand this.
The second point he made was that his generals had conducted many “tabletop studies,” and they all agreed with him that Korea was not being placed in jeopardy. I’m not familiar with what a “tabletop study” is, but I do know that generals have two options when the secretary asks whether he is right about something. They can agree with him or they can clear their “tabletop” and go home in retirement.
These “tabletop studies” must be code or have something to do with this new type of warfare where less is better than more. Rumsfeld also said that the U.S. had spent a lot of money, he guessed it may even be billions of dollars, and Myers murmured to him “yes, billions of dollars,” to ensure that South Korea would be well-protected in the absence of any credible U.S. force.
Finally, the secretary said that, should the North Koreans elect to attack, and he doubted that they would, the U.S. would respond with lots of “things” that we still had available. He specifically defined “things” as “airplanes and other things available to us.”
I have to respectfully disagree with the secretary of defense on this one, which I’m at liberty to do because I am already retired.
We are placing South Korea at risk.
In modern warfare, regardless of the century you are in, less is never better than more when it comes down to hard, cold combat power. Napoleon said victory goes to the man with the biggest battalions. That has not changed.
The North Koreans have a standing army of almost 1.5 million soldiers. It is well-equipped and has an incredible amount of modern artillery. I would define that as “more” in terms of raw and a brutal combat power.
South Korea, with its U.S. ally, has at best half of that, and considerably less artillery. We have traditionally counted on air power to help even the odds. The only problem with this concept is that about 50 percent of the time in Korea, it is not possible to fly close air-support sorties because of the weather.
Add to that how close the opposing forces will be to each other, and you have a recipe for disaster. Our current air campaign plans call for precision munitions against precision targets. We like to stand back and away from the target, put a laser dot on the target, or provide a GPS grid to the target, and then watch.
We do not fly low, and we quit using napalm 30 years ago. The North Koreans are all aware of how we do our business, so they will make sure that they are so close to us that we cannot use our air power effectively.
They learned that lesson very well in the Korean War.
What was left unsaid by the secretary when he was trying to explain how less was better than more is that the forces we’re pulling out of South Korea, in and of themselves, could not turn the tide of battle against the North Koreans, should they attack.
We are talking about perhaps 3,500 U.S. soldiers against the 1.5 million North Korean soldiers. But those 3,500 soldiers in South Korea declared our resolve to help defend Korea.
That is their value. The Korean War started in 1950 because the secretary of state, Dean Acheson, said in a speech earlier that year that South Korea was outside the United States area of interest. North Korea, with its Chinese and Russian allies, took that as an invitation to invade.
They collectively believed that the United States would not intervene. Although we are not making such a statement outwardly, by withdrawing forces from South Korea to fight in Iraq we may be inadvertently making this statement again.
But there may be another way the U.S. could “lose” South Korea. Recent events in South and North Korea are too coincidental for my liking.
South Korea announces after decades of silence and denial that it actually did have some rogue scientists conducting work that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons. Within a matter of hours, North Korea declares that its nuclear weapons work was in response to South Korea’s program.
A few days later, on Sept. 9, the 56th anniversary of the founding of North Korea, a huge explosion is detected, followed by a mushroom cloud. The North Koreans initially refused to say anything. Then, they say that the explosion was merely work on a hydroelectric project.
Sept. 9 is a huge national holiday, with everybody in the “workers’ paradise” released from work except, apparently, those poor hydroelectric workers. Shortly thereafter, the South Korean minister for reunification publicly apologizes for South Korea’s nuclear work but does not condemn or comment on the detonation in North Korea.
You need to note here that South Korea has a minister for reunification. His job is to work on all the issues necessary to reunify North and South Korea in a coherent manner, and as the Koreans used to tell me, in a “non-German” fashion.
And this is where the secretary may get lucky.
Some predictions.
I believe that North and South Korea are actually secretly close to reunification. When I served in South Korea in the early 1990s, I was aware through my sources that serious talks were ongoing then.
That was a decade ago. I think much progress has been made in this regard. South Korea is modernized and has a tremendous industrial base but a shortage of workers. North Korea, although possessing a large and well-equipped army, has no peaceful industrial base and has an abundance of workers.
A unified Korea could easily outstrip and overshadow the industrial and economic capacity of Japan in a few short years. That alone provides great impetus for reunification. The Koreans hate the Japanese well beyond how much they may hate each other.
It is patently obvious to all who care to look that the 21st Century will witness the rise of Asia as the locus for the dominant economic power of the world.
A unified Korea would exceed Japan in economic power and could garner significant market share from China. If China remains communist and disjointed in its economic policies and reforms, Korea may even exceed China in economic power.
I think the explosion was a nuclear test.
We have the capability and the technology to confirm or deny the North Korean claim. I have seen no indications or reports that we have done so. I further believe that South Korea was aware of the testing. If this had not been the case, the South Koreans would have gone into a defensive crouch as they have done in the past whenever North Korea did something unexpectedly.
Instead, the minister for reunification made a bland statement in the South Korean parliament. I believe all this is being orchestrated. South Korea by joining with a nuclear weapons-capable North Korea automatically joins the world’s exclusive nuclear weapons club.
They will do so without censure. The United Nations and the rest of the world will readily accept a unified Korea that is a nuclear power because North Korea will no longer exist as a rogue state that operates outside the pale of normal human endeavor.
One more nuclear power is a small price to pay for stability in the region.
North Korea will not attack because we have pulled some forces out to go fight in Iraq. The secretary is going to get lucky on this one, which is OK.
