In an election year in both the U.S. and Israel, it would certainly be politically expedient for the two governments to seek a face-saving formula and avoid an open rift over the administration`s linkage of the loan guarantees to the settlements.
Regardless of what short-term compromise might be worked out, sooner than later the larger issue of Israel`s right to settle Jews in the West Bank needs to be seriously addressed by the United States.
The issue of settlements and immigration of Jews to Israel is the heart and soul of revisionist Zionism ideology and is therefore the core of the Likud policy.
Labeling the settlements as illegal and an obstacle to peace does nothing but further aggravate U.S.-Israel relations, raise Arab expectations and potentially undermine the peace process. The question is: Does the U.S. really envision an Arab-Israeli peace without a permanent Israeli presence in the West Bank?
By insisting on freezing the building of new settlements for the loan guarantees, President Bush has put a dollar value on a Zionist principle-the Jews` inherent right to their homeland-and has certainly placed a dollar sign on the existing settlements for future bargaining. Beyond that, the settlements are an integral part of the Likud vision of the future of the West Bank and as such it would be inconceivable to forsake the settlements for money.
President Bush should not bet on the Israeli election scheduled for June to produce a dramatically different political landscape. The election will doubtless be a referendum on the peace negotiations and on the settlements issue. Considering the Israeli political scene, however, and the traditionally strong party affiliations, it is unlikely that either Likud or Labor be swept to power by mustering an absolute majority, (61 or more members out of 120 in the Israeli Kenneset).
In any case, the polls do suggest that both major parties, Likud and Labor, may equally gain a little at the expense of the small extremist parties from the Left and Right. As in the past, both parties would still need the religious parties-hard-core settlements supporters-to form a coalition government.
The difference between Likud and Labor regarding the final status of the West Bank is limited to one basic substantive issue: whether or not to divide the West Bank between Israel and Jordan. Labor favors the division plan, believing that the Arab state and the Palestinians will not make peace with Israel unless they regain some territory. Whereas Likud insists on retaining all of the West Bank under Israeli control, a Labor-led government will also be more accommodating on the pace and the extent of building new settlements. Otherwise, neither political party envisions a solution that would require Israel to abandon its settlements or freeze their expansion indefinitely. Moreover, both believe that peace and security cannot be achieved unless Jews and Arab Palestinians coexist, hence the necessity for the West Bank settlements in particular.
Having ”delegitimized” the settlements, the Bush administration has painted itself into a corner. If the U.S. wants to prevent any future right-wing Israeli government from a de-facto annexation of the West Bank, it must develop a more coherent approach to the settlements issue and seek a framework for peace that must incorporate Israeli settlements.
President Bush and Secretary Baker should know that neither a Labor-led nor a Likud government will ever abdicate the existing settlements as a national right and as a national policy for security reasons. True, there is no talk yet by the administration of rolling back existing settlements, but how does the administration plan to legitimize these settlements, which is an absolute requisite for peace? Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir or whoever might succeed him will not last a day if he is even perceived to be willing to compromise on the existing settlements.
Would it not then make considerably more sense for the administration to recognize Israel`s right to be in the West Bank in principle, which would imply acceptance of the existing settlements? The U.S. recognition should be offered in exchange for a freeze on building new settlements instead of linking the loan guarantees to the freeze. If faced with this option, the freeze will not raise the question of Jewish right, which most Israelis insist upon, but it will be viewed as a temporary move required by the political climate. The Israeli government will not be accused of having sold Zionism`s most sacred principle down the river.
The choice cannot be between settlements or money. No price tag can be put on such a complex issue so deeply infused with psychological, emotional, religious and historic implications. Compelling the Israeli government to choose between the loan guarantees and settlements will force it to choose the latter both out of defiance and in adherence to the most fundamental tenet of its Zionist ideology. The Bush administration stands to lose a critical lever to effect a change in the Likud policies now and in the future.
