Bosnia-Herzegovina looks like Switzerland but smells like diesel and cordite. In contrast, American policy in Bosnia has an onerous appearance but has passed the sniff test of national interest. President Clinton, like his predecessor, has been guilty of meaningless moralizing about aggression, genocide and violation of international borders–but wisely held to a hands-off policy that kept U.S. combat troops out of the war zone.
Until now.
Clinton on Wednesday declared his willingness to order the “temporary use” of American soldiers on the ground in Bosnia to guard United Nations peacekeepers on the run for safer positions.
Wrong, wrong, wrong. Until now, the White House clung steadfastly to its decision that U.S. ground forces would be deployed in Bosnia under two scenarios: to police a comprehensive peace treaty or to protect UN forces during a full and final withdrawal. Both made sense.
Clinton characterized his shocker as an extension of previous policy, one required by commitments to our NATO allies–notably Britain, France and Spain–that form the core of UN forces in Bosnia.
But no legalistic twist of the facts can cover the most important fact: this is a significant policy shift and one that easily could drag the United States into a complicated and lengthy involvement in Bosnia.
What, exactly, is meant by “temporary use?” How far would the U.S. be obliged to go as a hostile party to protect UN troops as they reposition? Clinton’s formula is hopelessly vague, subject to any interpretation.
The only redeployment of UN forces that deserves U.S. backing is a redeployment to home bases in Britain, France or Spain–in other words, a full withdrawal from Bosnia. It will be a messy operation to be sure, but one that makes sense given the UN’s abject failure. Not a single one of the peacekeepers’ missions in Bosnia can be accomplished from some bunker.
Perhaps Clinton is quietly signaling the opening move in a withdrawal and that U.S. troops will help UN forces consolidate prior to a pullout. As the time for any retreat nears, the warring parties can be expected to take more hostages and hijack tanks, artillery and armored vehicles.
The lessons of victory in the Gulf War and in Haiti, and of failure in Somalia, should not be forgotten. America’s armed forces are best used only when vital national interests have been carefully and openly articulated, and when overwhelming might can be brought to bear.
Clinton’s new policy for Bosnia meets neither of these conditions.
