With an agreement on Thursday that could end the war in Yugoslavia, several assumptions about its conduct are suddenly called into question.
Assumption No. 1: NATO could not hope to win the war without committing ground troops. In fact, aerial bombardment alone forced the Yugoslav leadership to capitulate.
Assumption No. 2: The 19 nations of NATO could not remain united, with their often-clashing views on how the war should be handled, and the conflict would end in a compromise that would weaken the alliance. In fact, NATO’s internal strains were kept in check, the alliance did not compromise on its goals and NATO emerges stronger than even many of its backers had anticipated.
Assumption No. 3: The war would fatally undermine the tenuous relationship between Western nations and Russia and might, as the more apocalyptic forecasters warned, even lead to a world war. In fact, an initially bellicose Russia came around to general acceptance of NATO’s uncompromising position, and that undoubtedly played a large part in persuading the Yugoslav leadership to throw in the towel. Russia’s special envoy ended up as one of the key diplomats who presented the final terms of an agreement to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
That said, Thursday’s agreement has not removed all of the doubts and criticisms about the morality of NATO policy or about the quality of American leadership. Those attitudes will undoubtedly have lingering after-effects.
But for now, NATO can legitimately indulge in self-congratulation. It has carved out a new European role for itself, using military power in support of a proposition that has won growing acceptance in international law–that stopping a gross violation of human rights takes precedence over national sovereignty.
The alliance has sent a message to dictators–not dictators everywhere, but certainly any nascent dictators who might come to the fore in Europe–that they cannot carry out crimes against their own people with impunity.
For many, one of the most surprising lessons of Thursday’s agreement was that air power alone apparently can win wars–at least in certain circumstances.
Scores of active and retired generals and other officers–not least NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Wesley Clark–warned repeatedly that air power could not stop paramilitary killers from doing their worst. It didn’t, but the destruction of much of a nation’s infrastructure eventually forced the political leadership behind the paramilitaries to cave in.
That depended crucially on the effectiveness of modern, American-led technology, which enabled pilots and cruise missile launchers to carry out attacks with greater accuracy than has been seen before. There were horrible mistakes, which caused needless destruction and loss of civilian life, but these were minimal in the overall context of the bombing campaign.
But one after-effect of this war will be a continuing debate over the morality of conducting war in this fashion.
By refusing to consider the use of ground troops at the outset, NATO enabled Milosevic to inflict untold suffering on Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population as his forces killed thousands of them, drove hundreds of thousands out of the province and uprooted more hundreds of thousands inside Kosovo.
By keeping planes flying at 15,000 feet or above, NATO avoided losses to its own forces, but increased the risk of erratic bombing and did nothing to stop the forced exodus of ethnic Albanians. To NATO’s critics, the message was plain: The life of one NATO pilot was worth more than those of thousands of Milosevic’s victims.
NATO leaders were deeply divided over the issue of ground troops. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the most fervent advocate of using them, and he had a certain amount of support from the French.
Even Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema, defying public opinion in his country, was willing to consider a ground campaign with Italian participation if the latest diplomatic efforts had failed.
But Greece, Germany and other European countries remained to be convinced, and President Clinton showed little inclination to consider a ground war. There was widespread criticism in Europe that Clinton was either too weakened after his impeachment battle or too lacking in will to mobilize American public opinion behind tougher action against Milosevic.
The result was a recognition among European leaders, whatever their views of the Yugoslav conflict, that they must take greater responsibility for European defense and rely less on American leadership.
This recognition is taking form here, at a summit meeting of European Union leaders that opened Wednesday, in a decision to build up Europe’s defenses so that in future conflicts Europe can act on its own, perhaps relying on the U.S. only for logistical help, if the U.S. is unwilling to commit combat forces of its own.
The 10-nation Western European Union, which has notionally been Europe’s joint defense arm but in fact has never played a significant role, will be wrapped up and its tasks taken over by the full 15-member European Union.
There are problems in doing this: Four of the 15 nations are neutrals that have taken no part in the NATO campaign. Building up European defenses will cost a great deal of money and involve a change in strategic thinking in most countries. Experts estimate the task will take 7 to 10 years. But at least a start has been made, and that is due primarily to the lessons of the current war.
The fact that NATO remained more or less united in pursuing its goals in Yugoslavia has been credited by many European leaders in part to the leadership of Spain’s Javier Solana as secretary general of NATO.
For that reason, the Europeans reached quick agreement to appoint Solana as the European Union’s first High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. He will act as a liaison among the 15 EU members and between the EU and the U.S., where he is well-respected.
Solana is expected to assume his new responsibilities when his NATO appointment ends in December, and there is widespread speculation he will be replaced at NATO by German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping. Scharping has won plaudits for his vigorous defense of NATO policy toward Yugoslavia.
Finally, NATO’s relationship with Russia has been tested severely but has emerged intact.
Before the war started, Russia already was smarting over NATO’s expansion to take in three of its former satellites, and NATO’s war against a traditional Russian ally, Serbia, was difficult for Moscow to bear.
But, despite threatening language from Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Balkans envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russians eventually played a crucial role in securing the agreement to end the conflict. By accepting NATO’s basic position, it demonstrated to Milosevic that his international isolation was complete.
The Russians may have been influenced partly by the fact they had become fed up with Milosevic’s unbending position.
The German government insisted from the start on a role for Russia in trying to bring an end to the war.
