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By Samuel Shen and Michael Flaherty

SHANGHAI/HONG KONG, July 9 (Reuters) – Wang Zhiyong, the

founder of a Shanghai-based gift card company, tried twice to

get a bank loan for his business and failed both times.

So Wang turned to China’s vast network of alternative

lenders, opting for a so called “curb side” loan. Such a loan is

just one segment of the country’s shadow banking system, which

includes pawn shops, credit guarantee firms, trust companies and

other mechanisms as sources of funds for Chinese borrowers.

“Banks never lend a hand to start-ups like us,” said Wang,

40. “They only go after big companies and state-owned firms.”

The dearth of bank credit available to China’s millions of

small to mid-sized companies is expected to tighten as

authorities seek to rebalance the world’s second-biggest

economy.

The central bank briefly allowed short-term interbank rates

to surge last month to crack down on lending tied to property

speculation and bloated local government debt.

The crackdown, however, only reinforced the dependency of

many of China’s non-state backed enterprises on the shadow

banking industry.

Fitch says some 36 percent of outstanding credit in China,

or 34 trillion yuan ($5.55 trillion), lies outside banks’ loan

portfolios, a huge pool of money which market participants find

difficult to track and which could cause an ugly credit mess in

a steeper slowdown.

Beijing now faces the difficult task of trying to re-direct

a non-bank financing system – created by the government’s own

lending policies – that has helped keep its economy humming.

“Shadow banking activities have increased because China

needs growth, and the banking sector has to a significant degree

failed in its role of financial intermediary,” Credit Suisse

said in a February research note.

For Wang, the greeting card company founder, tapping the

shadow banking industry was his only option, given that banks

usually do not lend to small enterprises and the stock and bond

markets in China are virtually shut.

He received a 5 million yuan, six-month loan from the curb

side lender, which charged him an annualized interest rate of 14

percent, or about twice as much as a bank loan.

ON THE CURB

The term shadow banking refers to any financing provided by

a non-bank entity.

The benefits of such a system are that it has allowed China

to liberalise its state-mandated interest rate policy – albeit

in an unorthodox manner. It’s also promoted a diversification of

funding mechanisms inside the country.

The risks come from building a system of credit largely out

of view of regulators and also one without a control mechanism

to assess if borrowers are even credit worthy. China, for

example, has never had a corporate bond default, and analysts

question whether risk is being priced appropriately.

China’s shadow banking boomed after a 2010 directive from

Chinese authorities to restrict the flow of bank loans. Beijing

was worried that the waves of loans prompted from a 2008

stimulus package was pushing up inflation, among other concerns.

Banks could lend to state-backed companies, but most of China’s

other corporations would have to find other methods of accessing

capital.

Non-bank lending has since flourished. China’s shadow

banking industry includes thousands of unofficial credit

providers, pawn shops, trust firms, and various other loan

vehicles.

On the flip side, it also includes so called “wealth

management products,” which are short term investment vehicles

sold by banks to the public, offering rates above the

state-mandated 3 percent savings rate. The products have allowed

banks to encourage parking money with banks even with inflation

rising.

With a tacit nod from Beijing, the banks can act as

intermediaries for shadow bankers and their clients without

taking debt onto their balance sheets.

With the crackdown, China’s regulators have taken aim at the

sale of wealth products as well.

The interbank lending spike in June that was engineered by

China’s central bank hit banks that were overly reliant on short

term borrowing, a reliance that analysts say came, in part, from

funding wealth product payouts promised at the end of each

month.

PAWN SHOPS

Curb side lending is a legal but unregulated type of high

interest loan, the main advantage being the speed in which the

money is handed over. Executives giving loans on behalf of their

companies, peer-to-peer lending networks and family members with

money to spare are considered part of this lending industry.

Monthly interest rates can exceed 40 percent, or annualised

rates of nearly 500 percent.

China’s pawn shops, which are licensed and regulated, are a

key layer of shadow banking, offering an array of non-bank loans

to individuals and companies. Bank of America said in a research

note last year that the size of China’s pawn shop industry at

the end of 2011 was 118 billion yuan.

The current size is around 500 billion yuan, according to

Joe Zhang, the Chairman of Wansui Micro Credit in Guangzhou.

Interest rates can go up to 35 percent on pawn loans, Zhang

says, with durations usually around three to six months.

One major advantage in borrowing from such an entity is

speed and efficiency. The loans can go out in days, sometimes

delivered in person, unlike the months it takes for a bank.

Wang Fuming, chairman of Shanghai Oriental Pawn Co, said his

company plays a key role in helping China’s small businesses,

since it lends to companies that banks see as high risk.

“We do what banks don’t do,” Wang said.

Oriental Pawn, which is one of Shanghai’s biggest pawn

shops, charges 4.7 percent per month on loans using cars as

collateral, and 3.2 percent per month on loans using real estate

as collateral, according to its web site, at six month tenures.

During Communist rule from 1956-1987, pawn shops were banned

in China. By the end of 2012, there were 6,084 pawn companies in

China, up 16 percent from a year earlier. Total assets of the

industry was up 34.3 percent to 116.8 billion yuan, according to

the Commerce Ministry.

Wen Shijie, owner of a small funeral service business,

walked into Oriental Pawn’s Shanghai headquarters with a gold

necklace.

Standing near a line of oil paintings, a statue of Marilyn

Monroe, and rows of luxury watches, he approached one of the

counters and made his case. Wen was able to borrow 10,000 yuan

against the necklace, for a short-term loan at a rate of 4

percent per month.

“I just want the money for emergency purposes,” he said,

adding that he preferred that type of loan rather than borrowing

from family.

DRINKING ‘POISON’

Beijing’s crackdown on risky lending in a slowing economy

puts the government in a tricky situation. By targeting the more

risky type of loans, its efforts may tighten a lending system

critical to providing credit to non-state backed entities.

“Shadow banking is actually playing a positive role in

China’s economy, because the current financial system is not

very reasonable or sound,” said Yan Hong, a finance professor at

Shanghai Jiatong University.

But Hong also acknowledged that the degree to which shadow

banking eases funding shortages for small to medium enterprises

was becoming disproportional.

“There’s the risk of quenching thirst by drinking poison,”

he said.

($1 = 6.1258 Chinese yuan)

(Additional reporting by Pete Sweeney in Shanghai and Lawrence

White in Hong Kong; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan)