* Informer was British citizen – sources
* Details of operation disclosed in U.S. media
* Experts say disclosure may harm future operations
By William Maclean
LONDON, May 11 (Reuters) – Counter-terrorism experts
expressed concern on Friday over U.S. leaks about an undercover
operation that foiled a suicide bomb plot, saying its exposure
may deter agents from volunteering for the risky job of
infiltrating al Qaeda’s network.
While electronic methods are increasingly used in espionage
operations of all kinds, human intelligence remains crucial
because al Qaeda’s best operatives try to avoid the use of any
electronic communications to minimise the chance of detection.
British intelligence played a central role in the operation
targeting al Qaeda’s Yemeni offshoot, counter-terrorism sources
told Reuters, by recruiting the informant who obtained the bomb
and handed it to Western intelligence officers. [IDn:nL1E8GAG0J]
The undercover operative in the plot linked to Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, was a British citizen, possibly
of Saudi origin, the sources said on condition of anonymity. The
informant was working in cooperation with Britain’s two
principal spy agencies.
The operation appears to have been a joint venture between
the British, Saudi Arabian and U.S. intelligence services, some
analysts say, and its exposure in the U.S. media has caused
widespread concern in the U.S. intelligence community.
The Saudis and British appear to be concerned too.
“The Saudis are not happy with the leaking of this
information,” said Mustafa Alani, a security analyst with good
contacts among Gulf Arab governments.
“It is potentially harmful for future operations. And it is
the Saudis who have the agents on the ground to get these things
done.”
A spokesman for Prime Minister David Cameron declined to
discuss the matter, but said: “Clearly we think that sensitive
information should be protected.”
Nigel Inkster, a former assistant chief of Britain’s Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS), said in a Twitter message: “The
revelations about the British agent in AQ (al Qaeda) remind us
that Beltway leaking is a major security threat.”
Patrick Mercer, a British Conservative Party lawmaker and a
specialist in security matters, said: “If this is not a
deliberate disclosure done for an operational purpose, then it
is a shocking example of a leak posing risks to highly sensitive
and important work.”
The operation appears to have been a notable
counter-terrorism success for the United States and its allies,
with the adroit use of an agent inside al Qaeda ranks likely to
provide particular satisfaction to Washington two and a half
years after the second most deadly attack on the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
On Dec. 30 2009, a Jordanian double agent, Humam Khalil abu
Mulal al-Balawi, blew himself up inside Forward Operating Base
Chapman, a well-fortified U.S. compound in Khost province in
southeast Afghanistan, killing seven CIA officers and a
Jordanian intelligence officer.
The attack showed militants were keener to kill Western
spies than to infiltrate their networks, underlining the
daunting challenge for Western services seeking to plant an
informant among al Qaeda’s senior ranks.
And yet the disclosure of the latest operation may make it
less likely that others will come forward to undertake such
undercover work against al Qaeda in future, analysts say.
INTERNAL REVIEW
In the latest case, Alani said AQAP had been duped into
recruiting the informant because, among other things, he held a
Western passport and appeared to have a militant cast of mind,
making it easier for him to be allowed to board a U.S.-bound
plane without undue suspicion.
But by definition individuals who have the temperament,
background and training to infiltrate the militant network are
few.
This is not the first time such leaks have disrupted
operations involving British and Saudi intelligence.
The most notable case where U.S. leaks potentially
jeopardised a British investigation was that of an al Qaeda plot
to blow up financial targets in the United States and carry out
“dirty bomb” attacks in Britain.
The eight-man cell, now serving long jail terms, were
arrested in daylight swoops by British police in 2004 after U.S.
officials revealed details about a Pakistani agent who was
involved in a sting operation.
The men had been under police surveillance and the release
of the Pakistan agent’s name in U.S. newspapers prompted the
British to act faster than they wanted.
Security analysts say British police were also forced to
arrest suspects believed to be planning to down transatlantic
airliners in 2006 earlier than they had wanted because U.S.
security agencies were putting them under pressure.
A lack of evidence meant the suspects were not initially
convicted of being involved in planning to target airliners and
led to a number of re-trials.
In a speech in 2010, SIS chief John Sawers said: “Agents
take serious risks and make sacrifices to help our country. In
return, we give them a solemn pledge: that we shall keep their
role secret.”
Secret organisations needed to stay secret, he said, even if
they occasionally presented “a public face”.
“Agents take risks. They will not work with SIS, will not
pass us the secrets they hold, unless they can trust us not to
expose them. Foreign partners need to have certainty that what
they tell us will remain secret – not just most of the time, but
always.”
The director of U.S. National Intelligence has opened an
“internal review” of U.S. intelligence agencies to determine
whether there were leaks of classified information related to
the underwear bomb operation.
Separately, the FBI is conducting a separate criminal
investigation into leaks, a law enforcement official said in
Washington.
(Additional reporting by Michael Holden and Mark Hosenball in
Washington; Editing by Andrew Osborn)
